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T HI RD-P ARTY INTERESTS AND THE P ROPERTY LAW 
MISFIT IN P ATENT LA W 
Sarah Rajecl 
COllrts (llld scholars have IOllg parsed the cllaracteristics of patent grants alld 
like lied them, n/temateiy, to real or persD/wi property law, monopolies, public 
Irtmc1lises (ma otller regulatory grallts, or (I hybrid of these. Tile cJulracterizations 
matter, heelillse they can detennine how patents are treated for tilt: purposes of 
administrative review, limitations, alld remedies, illter alia. And these varied 
trelllments it! tum affect jncentives to i/iliovate. Patents are ofrell likened to real 
property ill (I" effort to maximize rights alld allow ,,,velllors to internalize all of the 
benefits from their activities. And courts ofren turn first to real property allalogies 
wl,etl faced with "ovel issues jn patent law; ),et they do /lot always elld there. 
Sometimes, patents are public rights. Sometimes, they are protected by liability niles 
rat/,er than property rules. Alld sometimes, a U.S. patent cannot stop tile resale or 
importation of goods it covers. Patellts are very mud, like real property, it seems, except 
for when they are 11Ot. 
This Article argiles that these decisions are justified by a number of misfits 
between patent rights and traditional property rights and identifies and explores a 
previously understudied misfit that results from a lack of possessioll 011 the part of the 
patellt holder alld third-party property rights 011 the part of potential infringers. Qlle 
well-studied misfit is that patellt law imposes steeper information cost on third parties 
rlu", is typically thought to attend private property. TI'ere are a number of other 
• Associate Professor of Law, The College of Will ia m and Mary School of Law. I am grateful 
for the thoughtful feedback of Jonas An~r.;on, Daniel Brean. Nancy Combs. Brendan Costello, 
Gregory Day. John Duffy, l.aura Heymann, Timothy Holbrook. Mark Janis, Dmitry Karshtedt, 
Amy Landers. Allison Orr Larsen, Mark Lemley. Laura Pedra7.a-Farina. Joshua Sarnoff. Jake 
Sherkow. Sean Seymore. Matthew Sipe, Ned Sukhatme. Liz.a Vertinsky. Deepa Varadarajan, 
Saurabh Vishnubhakat and participants in the Junior Scholars in Intellectual Property Conference. 
Patent Scholars Roundtable IV. the 2018 Mid-Atlantic Patent Works-in-Progress Conference. and 
the Texas A&M Junior Faculty Workshop on the Patent-Tort Interface. 
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misfits, Iwwever, that have been under-examined. For example, pClfent law presumes 
a robust pllblicdomain-that is, a vast swath of "1m ow tied" ideas, whereas traditional 
real and personal property entitlements do /lot expire and render goods or land 
(lwlilable to a/l. Anotlier understudied misfit occurs becaltse patents affect third 
parties' freedom to lise their own property over whicll they exercise dominion_ 
Traditional forms oj property, in contrast, presume some level of dominioll by oWI/ers. 
Tilis Article identifies and describes the set oj patent law misfits "lid shows how, 
taken together, they explain the Court's deviatiolls frolll (I property law framework. 
More tllnll simply explanatory or predictive, however, this insight has IIormatil'e 
weight. The misfit is real, alld ill COlltexts where it is most re/evallt, a strict application 
of property niles will work against the values embedded in the plltent system. Par this 
reason, we need a clear accoullt of whell (illd why property rights may be (I starting 
point- but ought not be an endi/lg poillt- for doctrilwl evolution ill patent law. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Courts and scholars have alternately likened patent grants to private 
property,! monopolies,2 public franchises, ) water rights,4 and other 
regulatory grants. s These characterizations affect the scope and 
• .xl!', c.g., Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright, 94 U.S. 92, % (1876) (~A patent for an invention is 
as much property as a patent for land. The righ t rests on the s.amc foundation, anJ is surrounded 
and protected by the same sanclions.~); Henry E. Smith, lu tdleelual Properly as Properly 
Delilleatillg Elllillemellls ill IlZjonllaliOIZ, 116 VALE L.J , 1742 (2007) (suggesting that pa tents arc 
~property . like~ and that a property regime i5 well. adapted to sol\'C the infonnation cost problems 
presented by patents); ROBERT 1'. MERG ES, JUSTIFYING ISTEt.t.ECTUAt. PROPERTY 33-41 (20 11); 
Justin Hughes. Tile Plli/osop/ly of IlZlelleclrllll Properly, 77 GEO, L.J. 287, 296- 330 ( 1988); Adam 
Mossoff, ExclusiOlr alZd Exclllsive Use ilZ PalelZl Law, 22 HARV. J.I~ & TECH. 321, 322 (2009) 
(~ Patents are property,·); Adam Mossoff, lVlralls Proprny. PllllillS tlrt! Pieces Back Togetller, 45 
ARIZ. L REv. 371, 372 (2003) (arguing that an integrated theory of property best describes the 
C'o'olution of some intellectual property doctrinCll ami suggests how those doctrines ought to 
funClion); Wendy J. Gordon, A Properly Riglrl ill SdfExpressioll! Equalilyalld Indi.'idualism illihe 
Nail/fill Law of IlIldleelllnl Properly, 102 V ALE LJ. 1533, 1539 (1993) (arguing that a l.ockean and 
property.based theory of copyright, interpreted and applied correctly would-contrary 10 the 
arguments of many proponents of the property vicw of intellectua l property rights--gi\'e support 
to the general popula tion and to the population of creative users who m.oed to employ others' 
work"). 
, Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 572 U.s. 898, 901 (20 14) ("Congress has enacted 
palentlaws rewarding in"entors with a limited monopoly,~), 
J Oil States Energy SeIVS., LLC v. Greene's Energy Grp., LLC, t38 S. Ct. 1365, 1379 (2018); see 
also Seymour v. Osborne, 78 U.S. 516, 533 (1870) (" l.e tters patent are not to be regardoo as 
monopolies, created by the exe.:utive authority at the expense and to the prejudice of all the 
community except the persons therein namt.'d as patentees, but as public franc hises granted to the 
inventon; of new and useful improvements ... ,.). 
• !ke, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, IIlIelieduni USIIjructs: Trade !kcrels, 1101 News, alld lire UsujnlCluary 
Paradigm III Common Lnw, i/l llrrELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE COMMON LAw (Shyam 
Balgancsh ed., Cambridge U. Press 2013) (describing some types of intellectua l property as 
usufructuary property rights, albeit no( patents). 
• !ke, e.g., Mark A. Lemley, Properly, IlIlelieelual Properly, and Free Ridilrg, 83 TEX. L. REv. 
1031 , t073 (2005) (~ I ntellcctual property is ol)\'iously government regulation in the dallSic neutral 
sense of that tenn ....• ); Mark A. Lemley, Pnilli· Based IUleliecwal Properly, 62 UCLA L. REv. 1328, 
1330 (2015) (-II' righ ts are a fonn of government regula tion of the free market dcsignoo to seIVe a 
useful social end-encouraging innovation and creation.·); Shubha Ghosh, Patellts and Ille 
Regulatory Siale; Retllillking Ille Palenl Hargain Melaplior After Eldred, 19 BERKELEY TECH . L.J. 
1315, 1322-25 (2004); Ted M. Sichclman, Purging Pllte"t lAw oj-Pril'llle lAw" Remedies, 92 TEX. 
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limitations of patent rights. Advocates have used a private property 
analogy to argue for maxi mal patent rights that allow inventors to 
internal ize all orthe benefits of their acti vi ties.6 And courts often tum first 
to real property analogies when faced with novel issues in patent law; yet 
they do not always end there. In fact, the Supreme Court has deliberately 
ruled against variations of the patents-as-priva te-property arguments in 
a number of recent cases. Sometimes, the Court finds. patents are public 
rights. 7 Sometimes, they are protec ted by liabil ity rules rather than 
property rules. s And sometimes, a U.S. patent C3nnot stop the resale or 
importation of goods it covers.9 Patents are ve ry much like real property, 
it seems, except for when they are not. How do we know when a property 
analob'Y is appropriate and when it is not? This Article describes an 
underexplored set of misfits between patents and property and shows 
how these misfits lead the Court to seek limiting principles for paten ts in 
certain contexts. to In particular, this Article suggests that the divide 
between the inventor's ownership rights in a patented idea and third-
pa rty property interests in- and dominion over- potentially in fringing 
goods and materials undermines patent law's private property analogy. 
As a result. when third-party property interests are strongest. courts are 
most likely to deviate from the maximali st version of a private property 
rights understanding of patents. 
L. Rl:v. 517 (2014) (arguing for damages that optimi1£ innovation i ncenti\'e~ rather than tradi tional 
COlllpensatory damages). 
• Sec Le mley, Property. Ill/ellect iud Property, fwd Free Ridiug. supm note 5, at 1046 n T]he role 
of property th~'Ory is an important one, both lx'Cause it provides intellectual heft to justify the 
expansion and be<:ause it offers courts an attractive label-'free rider-that they can use both to 
identify undesirable conduct and to just ify its suppression."). 
, OilS/ates, 138$. Ct. at 1373. 
• eBay Inc. v. MercExchangc, LI.C, 547 U.s. 388 (2006). 
• Impression Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 1523 (20 17). 
I. Though many property law analogies might be applicable to patent law, there is a rights-
!IIuimization strain of property law theory that is often applied in patent law arguments. I take 
these arguments on their own terols and show their misfi t to patent law. This project explores 
C01.lrts' dismissals of property rights analogies as presellted by advoca tes, amici, and scholars. There 
arc numerous property law theories that might ii/SO be imported and provide some nuance to the 
contours of patent law, and when courts d ismiss the private propcrty analogy as argued, thcse other 
theories often infoml their holdings. This project focuses on predicting and justifying the decision 
to dismiss the analogy as it is presented. Sec itrf m Section II .A. 
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The Supreme Court most recently confronted th is classification 
question in Oil States Energy Services v. Greene's Energy Group, holding 
that for the purposes of post-grant ad min istrative review, patent rights 
had the characteristics of public fran chises rather than private property.1I 
It followed that the validity of a granted patent may be determined by an 
administrative adjudication- not exclusively by an Article III court, as 
would be the case if patents were considered private property in that 
context. In its briefing stage, the case attracted a number of amici arguing 
that any resolution that fa iled to uphold patents as private property rights 
in all contexts would go against the tide of history and result in ruination 
of the patent system. 12 In 2013, then-Chief Judge of the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit- the court with exclusive 
jurisd iction over patent appeals-suggested that administrative judges 
reviewing and potentially invalidating granted patents were "acting as 
death squads. killing property rights."!) The Court did not heed the 
warning. instead upholding post-grant administrative review as 
constitutional. The government granted patent rights, the Court 
reasoned, and so was within its right to set up a mechanism for 
reassess ing that grant, much like is done with public franchises.14 The 
opinion came with quite a caveat- that in other contexts, such as takings, 
patents may still be regarded as private property ri ghts. IS This leaves open 
the questi on of how to determine whether a particular context merits 
private property treatment or another approach. 
11 Oil Siaies. 138 S. Ct. at 1373. 
II See. e.g .. Brief of Amicus Curiae Eagle Forum Education & Legal Defense Fund in Support of 
Petitioner at 13, Oil States, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (No. 16·712),201 7 WL 3773874, at ' 13 (ci ting Phyllis 
Schlafly and Ayn Rand's support for strong, private property rights in patents and dedaring tha t 
W[nJot only has this Court never accepted the notion that patent rights arc puhlic rights, hu t this 
Court has repea tedly implied the opposi te~). 
OJ In 2013, then-Chief Judge of the Uni led States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 
suggested tha t agency judges rcvi~ing and potentially invalidating granted patents were Ma.cting as 
death squads, killing property righ ts. ~ Tony Dutra, Rader Regreu CLS Bmlk Impasse, Comments 011 
Latest Patellt Reform Bill. BLOOMBERG (Oct. 29. 20 13) [https:J/perma.cc/MUY6-9UCR).Anamicus 
hriefin Oil St(ltes echoed this language and SUSSC$led Ihat post-grant administrative review results 
in Mnear·total annihila tion of property rights." Briefof Amici Curiae U.S. In\'enlor, Inc. & 31 Other 
Grass RoOls Inventor Orgs. in Support ofPetilioner, mpm note 12, al 3. 
If Oil Stales, 138 S. Ct. at 1373. 
,~ Id. 
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The Oil States holding was no isolated occurrence. A strain of 
argument casting patents as private property rights has been promoted-
and lost- at the Supreme Court a number of times in recent yea rs. 16 From 
decisions about permanent injunctions to the first sale doctrine, the 
Justices. at least, seem far from convinced that a private property rights 
analogy is the best prism to resolve complicated cases about the scope of 
patent entitlements. In 2006. the Court decided eBay Inc. v. 
MercExcliange, LL(17 and was exhorted to hold that patents- as exclusive 
property rights- could only be enforced through the issuance of 
permanent injunctions. It did not so hold, and the case is generally 
understood as encouraging district courts to deny injunctive relief more 
frequently. Then, in 2008 and 20 17, the Court issued rulings on the 
doctrine of exhaustion that narrowed patent holders' abilities to craft 
post-sale restrictions on their goods through patent enforcement actions, 
whether th rough use restrictions or when goods are fi rst sold ab road. 18 
What explains these deviations from the proffered private property 
law framework? The answer- as recen t Supreme Court decisions 
indicate- is in the con text of the rights assertion. This Article prOvides a 
clear accoun t of when and why the private property rights analogy l9 fails 
to explain court decis ions on patent law. A review of patent doctrine 
shows that the property analogy indeed has strong explanatory power in 
some contexts- particularly when boundaries are clear, information 
costs are low. and the public interest is best served by rights-holder 
autonomy. Earlier scholarship has explored the ways that patents do not 
always fit these requirements: boundaries are not always c1ear,20 
information costs are not always low,21 and sometimes rights-holder 
autonomy leads to low levels of access without spurring great 
innovation.22 However, there are other, underexplored fundamental 
,. See discussion illira Part Ill. 
" eBay Inc. v, Merc Ell:change, LtC, 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006) . 
.. Quanla Computer, Inc. v.lG flees., Inc., 553 U.S. 6 17 (2008) (applying exhaustion to nu llitY 
restrictive licenses accompanying a sale); Impression Prods" Inc. v. Lexmark Int'l, Inc., 137 S. Ct. 
1523 (20 17) (applying exhaust ion to authorized sales abroad). 
" As used in patent law. See supra note 10. 
» See ilWa notes 182-189 and accompanying text. 
" See ilifra notes 182-189 and accompanying text. 
1.I See, e.g., Rachel E. Sachs, Prizillg !/lSurallC£: Pr£5Criplioll Dru8 /lIsurtlllU as /lIlIomliOIl 
Illullti ,'e, 30 BARV. ).1... & TECH. 153 (20 16) (discussing ho\\' distort ions in the palent system lead 
to the underdevelopment of drugs and proposing insurance-based solut ions). 
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misfits behveen pa tent law and a private property fra mework that 
exacerbate the boundary uncertainties and in formation cost problems of 
patents. These misfits become apparent through a close r examination of 
the in rem rights framework used to describe and justify exclusive rights 
like patents. 
Rights in Tern are rights "in a thing." In the case of patents, that 
"thing" is information- and the patent balance depends on the inventor 
sharing her information with the public , even while enjoining others 
fro m making, using, or selling things that embody her in vention . This 
means that, for patents, unlike for real o r personal property, the thing in 
which rights are claimed is separate from the th ings that may ultimately 
infringe the patent)3 This separatio n between protected and infringing 
thing is important because it means that an inventor will o ften not have 
possession of infringing goods. She exercises no dominion over 
infringing embodiments of her idea, the protection of which is entirely at 
the mercy of legal enforcement rather than any exe rcises in defense of 
property. Instead. a th ird party likely has possessory in terests in the very 
materials used to in fringe. The paten t on ly ensures that an invento r had 
"possession" of the idea for the invention at the time of filing, 24 whereas 
in fringing goods are made of property owned by third parties. This lack 
of possession partially explains the notice problems and increased 
information costs associated with patents as compared with other 
propertyentitlements. 25 
This possession misfit is exacerbated by another important misfit 
between property rights and patent law that deri ves from granting in rem 
rights in intangible information which , once disclosed, is difficult to 
possess. Patent law contemplates-and through term limits, demands-
;, !ke. e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Tile Nnlllre nud Fllllclioll of tile Pntellt Systelll. 20 J.L & EcON. 
265.268 (1977) (~(Tlhe invention as claimed in the patent claims and the physical embodiment of 
the invention are two quite different th ings.~}; Michael /. Madison, Lnw as Desig"; Objects. 
Omcrpts. nlld Digital I1Ii1rg5, 56 CASE W. REs. L REV. 381. 383 (2005) (WI TJhere is the actual device 
that the inventor developed, and there is the legally distinct thing that the patentee owns. which the 
law knows as the patent claim.;. 
/. Timothy R. Holhrook.Possessio" ill Pnle"'lAw.59SMUI~ REv. I 23.126-27(2006)(arguing 
that various patent doctrines are geared towards ensuring an in"entor -posscsscd~ the in''Cntion at 
the time of fi ling). 
'" Carol M. Rose, PoS5e55;Oll /lS lire Origi" of Property, 52 U. CHI. L REv . 73, 81 (1985) (linking 
the significance of possession in property law with notice and boundary clari ty), 
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that the re be a robust public domain. That is. patent law en tails a vast 
amount of "unowned" knowledge by design. Private property law 
generally acts to resolve entitlement disputes among particul ar pa rties. 
but there is no expectation that in a large nu mber of cases, a judge will 
pro nounce the disputed property to be unowned by anyone and thus, 
available to all.26 The literature discussing the publi c interest in access in 
patent law is consistent with thi s concern , but it fa ils to convey the 
magnitude of this difference between the fram eworks. Whi le information 
costs are frequently higher in patent law than in real property, the costs 
are even higher when taking into account that third parti es must conduct 
costly patent searches even when the result is that the in fo rmatio n is free 
fo r all to use, whether because it was never claimed in a patent or because 
the relevan t patents have expired .27 The central importance of unowned 
information and the public domain to patent law explains why courts are 
reticent to use property law framing to bolster patent rights in 
technological contexts characterized by high rates of invalid ity. The 
notice and in formation costs to third parties are h igh enough in the 
paten t context- when compounded with the cost of invalidating 
improvidently granted patents protecting in formation that ought not to 
be owned at all- that it is no wonder that courts find the property law 
framework does not resolve all open questio ns. 
Understanding the specifi cs of these misfi ts helps to predict and 
explain when courts are more likely to move away from private property 
law in contextuali zing patent rights. In addition to pred ictive power, 
there is normative weight to these observations as well. The misfit is real, 
and its effects are most pronounced when third -party interests weigh 
most heavily- particularly third-party property interests and third -party 
interests in a robust public domain. These interests are often 
unaccounted for in the traditional, private property framework as it has 
been presen ted in patent law. To be fai r, there are many limiting 
principles that apply to private pro perty rights. Sometimes, these limiting 
principles inform the Court's decisions that appea r to dismiss the 
arguments made in favor of a property rights framework. However, 
.. This assertion is certa inly true with resped to personal property. In the case of real property, 
"'hile there are many types of public lands. the likelihood that a particular parcel of land in dispute 
is held publicly rather than pri"ately is not a primary factor in every trespass case; whereas for patent 
infringement suits. questions of scope and va lidity are ubiquitous and crucial. 
11 See. e.g .• Clarisa wng. lll!QnllatiQn OJsls in Patent and OJpyrigllt, 90 V A. 1.. REv. 465 (2004). 
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determin ing how and when analogous property-law limitations shou ld 
apply in patent law is not so simple. For th is reason, a clea r account of 
when and why property rights may be a starting point but ought not be 
an ending poin t for doctrinal evolution is valuable. 
Part I describes patent law and the appeal of property law as an 
explanatory framework for the different contexts in which patents 
operate. Part II describes three types of cases in which courts have 
eschewed the strong version of property rights in resolving patent law 
issues. Part III explains the patent law misfit to private property law rights 
analogies. Part IV shows how the misfit ex plains the exemplary cases and 
responds to potential criticism. 
I. P ATENTS ANDTHE P ROPERTY LAW N ARRATI VE 
Congress is empowered to grant patent protection to inven tions in 
order to promote progress. Paten ts have been credited with b ringing new 
methods of glassblowing to Florence, salt-making to England, and, since 
the founding of the United States, fo r encouraging the developmen t and 
improvemen t of lightbulbs, airplanes, disposable diapers, the 
communications industry, and countless medicines and medical devices. 
But what is the nature of that right? To say that patent rights are property 
ri ghts is in some sense not to say much at all .28 Patents are a right to 
exclude. which. we are told. is the core of a property entitiement. 29 The 
more important question. then . is not what the nature of a patent right is. 
but whether patents- as one form of property entitlement-are defined 
or constrained by the characteristics of other property entitlements. 
However, there are many types of property rights with varied 
cha racteristics. Thus. property rights may be structured as real or 
personal, public or private, and tangible or intangible; these structures 
come with different limitations and serve different pu rposes in different 
contexts. Real property refers to rights in land, and includes many forms 
of ownership, entitlement, and limitation. Personal property refers to 
:& Justin !-Iughes, 71,e Pili/osopliy of Ill tellcetual Property. n Gw. L J. 287, 291 ( 1988) 
(M[ l]nteilcctua l p roperty shares much of the orig ins and orientation of all fonns of property.·). 
"See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Property and tl,e Right to Exclude, n NEB. L REv. 730, 752 
( \ 998) (M[T ]he right 10 exclude is the sine qua non of property.·). 
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moveable goods which may be tan gible. like cars, mach inery, or clothing, 
or intangible. like stocks, pension funds, software. or data. )O And while 
the Anglo-American legal tradition places great im portance on these 
private property rights, there is also a tradition of recognizing public 
rights as well, often "in resources that are not easil y turned into private 
property," such as air and waterY 
While property ri ghts can take many form s, the private property 
rights-view of patents32 is increasingly used in scholarship and advocacy33 
to argue in favor of expansive paten t rights and against limitations- even 
when there are corresponding li mitations in pri vate property Jaw. H The 
fi rst Section of this Part begins by explo ring the appeal of a property rights 
model to ac hieve patent law purposes. In short, the exclusive. in rem 
nature of patent rights serves many of the same goals as pri vate property 
rights, such as encouraging innovation thro ugh careful boundary-setting, 
providing for transfer, and ensuring certai n forms of re medial relief upon 
a find ing of in fringement. The subsequent Sections describe how private 
property analogies have been applied to frame issues of patent grant and 
scope, coordination and transfer of goods, and remedies for 
infri ngement. 
A. Patents' Purposes alld tile Exclusive Rights Model 
Property is an expansive term, and because this Article does not 
argue that property law is irrelevan t to describing the role, value, and 
.. See, e.g., BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND TIlE CONSTlTlJTlON 166-67 ( 1977) 
(discussing ~Iega l property" such as intangible property and suggesting that the question when 
dealing with legal property -is not whether a 'Ihing' has been taken. but whcther those who lose as 
a result of the redistribution of property bundles ought to be cOnlpt!nsa tcd by those who gain-), 
Jl Carol M . Rose,A Dozell Propositions 011 Private Propert)', Public Riglrts, lind tire New Takillgs 
Legis/alioll, 53 \V ASH. & LEE 1.. REv. 265, 267 (1996) (cri tiquing the property rights nlm'enlent's 
expansive position on takings law). 
Jl The private property rights view of patents is part of the general propcrtiulion of intellectual 
property, which includes Ihe use ofthe lerm - intellectual property- to refer to patents, copyright, 
trademark, and trade secret law. See, e.g., Michael A. Carrier, Cabillilrg Illtellec/ual Property 
Tlrrouglr a Property paradigm, 54 DuKE L.J. 1,8 n.8 (2004). 
)J See supra notes \2- 13 . 
... See, e.g., Carrier, mpra note 32, at 10 n. 13 (2004) (discussing the -absolute rights· view of 
property that is at odds .... .jlh the reality of property law enforcement). 
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limitations of patent rights, it makes sense to take a momen t and explain 
the particular view of paten ts as private property that th is Article 
challenges, even though the scope of this Article is a larger reassessment 
of when courts are likely to look beyond property analogies to resolve 
conflicts-and even if courts often ultimately settle on property-like 
limitations as that resolution. Arguments that patents are like private 
property generally center on real property analogies, although m any 
refe rence the 1952 Patent Act's declaration that "patents shall have the 
attributes of personal property,"35 as wel l. Although the scope and 
limitations of real and personal property often differ, both are in voked in 
arguments that argue for stronger patent rights.36 Thus, for example, 
Adam Mossoff argues for a property rights view of patents by noting that 
the statute prOVides patents with the characteristics of personal property 
before asserting that " it is beyond doubt that patents are property 
rights,"37 and then arguing for a view of patents that is primarily 
expressed in real property analogy and rhetoric.lI Simone Rose argues 
that patents are property. positing that "ownership of paten ts is no 
d ifferent than the ownership of any other property right," but critiquing 
the statute for being amenable to other interp retations. as welL39 In a 1990 
essay. Judge Frank Easterbrook ha il s the Court's turn away from referring 
to patents as monopolies and uses a real property comparison to explain 
that 
» Patent Act of 1952, Pub. L. No. 82·593, 66 Stat. 792, 810 (codified as amended at 35 U.S.c. 
§ 26 1 (201 8)). 
JO Greg Re illy, Cougr='s Power /0 Define Pnle,1/ RiglJts II (May 6, 20( 9) (unpublished 
manuscript) (draft on file with author) (" [M Jany seem to characteri7.e patent rights as 'property' 
less to invoke a theoretical concept of property rights and more as shorthand for a co iled ion of 
long. standing historical characteristics of patent righ ts that may have analogs in the traditional law 
of real property and arc generally favorable to patent owners .... "'). 
p Mossoff, £Xc/usiou nud Exclusive Use iu Pmelll i llW, supm note I, at 326. 
J.I Adam Mossoff, Till: Trl!5prus Fillillcy i71 Pale/U Law, 65 I:LA. L. REV. 1687, 1692 (20 13) (- Early 
American courts conceptualized patents in the same terms as conllllon law property rights, and 
thus Ihey relied on and employed concepts, doctrines, and rhetoric from real property in crafting 
the doctrines thaI now comprise the American palent system: ). Mossoff notes tha t the passage of 
the act was accompanied by somc concern about the implications of detenllining that patents are 
personal property, rather than stating that patents have attributes of both personal and real 
property. Mossoff, ExdllSioll alld ExclllSil'C Use ill Pel lell l Law, supra note I, at 343. 
,. Simone A. Rose, Patellt -MOIlOpolypllObia-: A Mealls of Exlillgllislliug tile Fouulaiullead~, 49 
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 509, 515 (1999) (quot ing Edmund W. Kitch, Paleuls! Mouopolil!Sor Property 
Rigl'ts~. 8 RI'S. L. & EcON. 31,33 ( 1986»). 
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[pjatents give a right to exclude, just as the law of trespass does 
with real property. Intellectual property is inta ngible, but the 
right to exclude is no di fferent in principle from General 
Motors' right to exclude Ford from using its assembly line, or an 
apple grower's right to its own crop.40 
Greg Dolin and Irina Manta argue that courts do consider patents to be 
property for takings purposes, and suggest that therefore, the legislative 
changes that strengthened post-issuance review of patents constitute a 
legislative taking; a recent case holding otherwise is now under appeal at 
the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.~l For its part, the appellate 
court has found that infringement by the government is not a taking, 
though its language is consistent with a view of patents as property, writ 
l a rge . ~2 This line of reasoning is amenable to rul ings that patent laws are 
limited- whether those limitations requi re ana logs in o ther areas of 
property law or not- but recen t years have seen it as a way of recasting 
patents as constitutionally unlimited .~3 
In the United States, patents are seen as drivers of innovation.44 
Paten ts se rve this purpose by gran ting term- limited exclusive rights to 
• I:rank H, Easterbrook, Intellectual Properly Is Still Property, 13 IIARV. J.L & PUR. !'OL'Y 108, 
]09 (]990) . 
., Gregory Dolin & Irina D. Manta, Taking PalenU, 73 WAS!I. & LEE L REv, 719 (20]6); 
Christy, Inc. v. United States, ]41 Fed. CI. 641, 649 (2019) . 
., w itek Corp. v, United States, 442 F.3d 1345, ]35 1-53 (Fed. Cir. 2006), !lamted 011 oilIer 
grounds, 672 F.3d 1309, 131 7-22 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (en banc portion), rdying Oil Schillinger v. Uni ted 
States, 155 U.S. 163 (1894). The court explains that "laJs the Supreme Court has dearly rccognizN 
when considering Fifth Amendment taking allegations, 'property interests ... arc not creatN by 
the Consti tution. Rather, they are created and their dimensions arc defined by existing rules or 
understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law .... Here, the patent righ ts 
arc a creature of federal law." Zoltek, 442 F.3d at 1352 (al teration in original) (internal ci tations 
omined) . 
... See supra note 36. 
H Forexample, the terms -patents- and -innovation- fea tured prominently in numerous State 
of the Union addresses over the past decade- although the word - patent- did not fea ture in either 
of!'residcnt Trump's addresses to date, the word -inno\'llte· was mentioned in the 20 19 Stale oflhe 
Union address in the context of defensc. See, e.g., Brian Fung, EI'ery Time Oballla HilS Said 
'IlI/lOl'lItjOlr' ill His Stllte of tile UlliOlr Speeches, WASH, POST (Jan. 20, 2015, 9:45 AM), 
hnps:llwww.washingtonpost.comlnews/the-switchlwpI20 15/0 II200e\'ery-lime-obama-has-said-
inno\'ation· in- his-state-of-the- union-spccchcs/?utm term_.4519b2] old 195 [https:l/pcrma.cd 
Q3ZJ -3D58J; Donald Trump, President of the United States, Remarks by President Trump in State 
of the Union Address (Feb. 5, 20]9), https:llwww.whitehousc.gov{briefings-stalcmentslremarks-
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make, use, sell , and import inventions. The informatio n and invention at 
the heart of a patent is fundamentally non rival and nonexcludable, 
presenting the potential for underproduction abse nt government 
in tervention. Patent rights are one such intervention; they create 
exclusivity in knowledge. alloWing rights holders to charge a premium 
price to recoup research and development costs and potentially much 
more.45 Inventors and thei r sponsors are more likely to invest in 
developing promising technology when they will be able to rely on 
exclusive rights to prospecti ve profitS. 46 
The general statement that patents are property derives from their 
nature as exclusive rights. It also has intuitive appeal for describing what 
and why patents are granted. Accord ing to the analogy, patents allow an 
inventor to "'possess" a certain intellectual space, invest in it and reap 
awards commensurate to its value, wh ile granting notice and disclosure 
to others th rough the signposts of claim language. Patent rights are unlike 
other «bund les" of property rights in that they consist solely of rights to 
exclude- and even that right is time- limited. The exclusive nature of 
patents, then, seemingly makes them perfect examples of property 
rights-rights held in re m.47 
Rights in rem are held by one entity and good agai nst the world.48 
Literally rights in a thing, they do not focus on specific duties betw'een 
prcsident. trump-state-union-address-2 [https:llpemla.ccI24PW-5AAQ];see IIlso Sapna Kumar, 
Imwmlion Nillionll/i$m, 51 Co~N. L REV. 205, 225-29 (20t9) (showing that technological 
innovation has be.:ome a part of U.S. identity and arguing that the innova tion incentive of patent 
law has only become a focal point of policy in the past fifty years or so). The empirical question of 
whether patents drive innovation-or \~hether they are the best means of driving innovation-
remains unanswered. See, e.g., Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Plltent t:Xperimcnllllism. tOt VA. L REv. 
65.66. 75 (20 t5) ("[W]e lack answers to fundamental empirica l questions in patent law[]" such as 
whether patents "provide a net inno\'ation incentive. "J. 
~ As Abraham Lincoln more eloquently put it, patents "add[] the fuel of illtenst to the fire of 
genius'- Abraham Lincoln, Second Lectllre 011 Discoveries IIl1d fnvelltiollS, ill 3 THE COLLECTED 
WORKS OF ABRAHAM U!'COL.'< 363 (Roy P. Basler cd, Rutgers Univ. !'ress 1953) . 
.. Kitch , sl/pm note 23, at 265-68 . 
., Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. t64 , 179- 80 ( 1979) (recognizing that "the 'right to 
exclude'" is "universally held to be a fundamental clement of the property right~ (internal citat ions 
omitted»; Ruckelshaus v, Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, lOt I ( 1984) (-rhe righ t to exclude Ofhers is 
generally 'one of the most essential st icks in the bundle of rights that are commonty characterized 
as property.'" (internal citations omitted» . 
.. Merrill , SUpTil note 29, at 741 -52 (arguing that the righ t to exclude is the most important of 
those bundled into property); DoUGLAS LAYCOCK, MODERN AM ERICAN REMEDIES: CASES AND 
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named people, like in personam rights. but rathe r the relationship of the 
whole world of non-owners to the thing which is the subject of the 
entitlement.49 Real property provides examples of the cha racteri stics and 
advantages of exclusive rights. The framework of exclusive rights finds 
justification, inter alia, in utilitarian theory that allowing an owner to 
exclude others and reap the benefits of ownership will encourage her to 
in vest in ways that will put land and goods to productive uses. 5O My right 
in a plot of land includes the ability to exclude all others from that land.sl 
Thus, for exam ple, if I know I will be able to harvest its sweet fruit , I will 
undertake planting and caring for a plum tree on m y property. In 
contrast, if I am not able to exclude others from my property, I have less 
incenti ve to invest, knowing that the fruits of my labor may be 
appropriated by anyone who chooses to harvest the plums. 52 Conversely, 
exclusive rights require an owner to in ternalize the costs of exploitation 
of her property, so that land, for example, will not be used for wasteful 
purposes or over-used. 53 In patent law, as in real property, the 
M ATERIALS 843-44 (3ded. Aspen 1.aw & Hus. 2002) (explaining that rights in rem are literally righ ts 
in a thing, and contrast with in personam rights, which are rights held against a specific person or 
people). 
'" ]n Justinian's Institutes, persona] and rea] actions are d i5tinguished as disputes hetween 
pf..'Ople for speci fic duties owed and disputes that center on th ings. JUSTINIAN'S ]NSTITUTSS ~ 4.4.6, 
at 127 (Peter Birks & Grant Mcleod trans., 1987) n E]"ery action which takes an issue between 
parties to a trial before a judgc or arbiter is either real or personal. A plaintiff may sue a defcndant 
who is under an obligation to him, from contract or from wrongdoing. The personal actions lic for 
these claims .... Or else hc may suc a dcfendant who is not under any kind of obligation to him but 
is :;omcone with whom hc is in disputc about a thing. Here the real actions lie."). 
5t Carol M . Rose, CaUOII5 of Property Talk, or, /JIacks/oues Auxie/y, 108 YALE LJ. 601,606- 07 
(1998) (discussing Blackstone: "That , of course, is the great utilita rian claim for the exclusivc 
character of property: Exclusive dominion is useful because it reduces confl icls and induces 
producti\'e incentives."). 
) 1 See, e.g., 2 W llUAM BU.C KSTONE, CoMME."HARIES "2 (describing property rights as rights a 
man exercises -in lotal exclusion of lhe right of anyolher individual"). Th is absolute statement has 
givl!n way to morl! nuancl!d views-and was itsel f follo"'ed by elaboration and contl!xtualization. 
See, e.g., Rosc,5upm note SO, at 606 (suggesting that Blackstone's vicwwas itself more nuanced than 
it is often gin 'n credit for and then diSCUS$lng ut ili larian just ificat ions for exclUSionary rights). 
)J See Harold Demsctz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. Eco!". REv. 347, 355-58 
(1967). 
'" See id. at 356 (M[The] concentrat ion of benefits and costs on ownel"$ creates incenli\'cs to 
utili7.c resources more efficiently."). 
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exclusionary right is seen as a way of encouragi ng efficient investments 
and reap ing the in formation cost savings of bright line property rules.S4 
Exclusion is the hallmark of property rights, and particularly real 
and personal property law. govern ing rights in land and other "'things," 
The metaphor of property is also appealing to those who find purchase in 
the labor theory of intellectual property. And , in contrast to other types 
of public rights, patents cover something that would not have existed but 
for the work of the inventor. 55 "The world," in turn , benefits from the 
disclosure of new information that eventually joins the public domain of 
unowned ideas, free to all. In the interim, patent disclos ures se rve as 
notice to the public and other innovators of that which they are 
prohibited from doing, absent authorization . 56 
B. Tile Grant and Scope of Patents as Property Botmdaries 
For patents, real property analogies are at their most in tuitive when 
desc ribing the process of granting patents and determining the 
appropriate scope of the righ t. The real property incentives to invest, 
discussed above in the example of plums, appl ies to investment in 
innovation as well. These investment incentives are evident in general 
utilitarian accounts of patent rights as well as the prospect theory of 
patents, introduced by Edmund Kitch, which suggests that patent grants, 
like the grant of mineral claims, allow an inventor to sketch the 
boundaries of her invention and manage subsequent investment, use, and 
resea rch within those bounds. 57 The theo ry spells out how patents do not 
simply reward inventions that have already occurred at the time of their 
gran t, but allow the inventor to reap rewards from post-invention 
~ Festo Corp. v. Shokctsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushilti Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-3 1 (2002). 
» See. e.g., Unitcd States v. Dubilicr Condenser Corp .. 289 U.s. 178, 186 (1933) ("'Thus a 
monojXlly takes somcthing from the people. An inventor deprivcs the public of noth ing wh ich it 
enjoyed before his discovcry, but gi\'es something of value to the comnlunity by adding to thc sum 
of human knowledge. · ). 
j6 Thomas W. Mcrrill & Hcnry E. Smith, W/ult /fappc/ICd 10 Properly i,l Law and Eamomic;?, 
III YALE LJ. 357, 359, 385-88 (2001) (explaining that the in rem nature of property scrvcs to put 
others on notice of the negative duties that go along with thc property). 
", Edmund Kitch presented a thcory of patcnt law that suggests patents are prospect rights., like 
mineral claims, so that an invcntor sketches out thc boundaries of her claims and manages the 
subsequcnt investments, usc, and research within those bounds. Kitch, supra note 23, at 275-76. 
1874 CARDOZO LA W REVIEW [Vol. 4U859 
inveshnent that fall within the patented claims. S8 Mark Lemley has 
suggested that prospect theory is "one of the most significant efforts to 
integrate intell ectual property with property rights theory."S9 while John 
Duffy has shown that. because patents are limited in duration, the race to 
patent envisioned by prospect theory also hastens the entry of patented 
ideas into the public domain , thus serving the public interest in access to 
information.60 
Boundaries are central to the goal of scaling patent rights to 
in ventive contribution through the use of property-type rules of 
exclusion. By granting exclusive rights-rather than prizes or gran ts, for 
exam ple- patents are intended to allow inventors to appropriate returns 
commensurate with the value of their inventions, thereby encouraging 
efficien t leve ls of investment. Patent seekers publicly claim, then develop 
and sell their inventions- or license their rights to others who will- in 
order to profit. And potential profits are dependent o n market demand 
and available substitutes rather than ex ante government valuation.6 1 
Rather than a government enti ty determining the worth of different 
innovations, once a patent application has been examined and met the 
requi rements of novelty, non -obviousness, and utility. the applicant is 
entitled to a grant.62 A "bad" invention (whether it has no appeal to 
consumers or must compete with superi or products) will likely fail to 
attract investment or, even if it does. fail on the market; a "good" 
in ve ntion may stand to bring its inventor and any investors large profits 
th roughout the patent term.63 
In order to ensure that rewards are properly calibrated to the worth 
of an invention, the scope of protecti on of paten ts is limited. 
50 Id. 
)0 Mark A. lemley, The Ecouomics of Improvcmcul ;u lulcllec/!ud Properly Law. 75 TEX. L. REv. 
989, 1045-46(1997) . 
.. John 1'. Duffy, Retllinking tile Prospect 'I1rl'Ory of Plllct/is. 71 U. CHI. L REv. 439, 443-44 
(2004) . 
.. Harold Dcmsctz, IrifomwliOlI and Efficierrcy: Arrollrcr Viewpoirrl. 12 J.L & EcoN. I, 11- 14 
(1969). 
~ See 35 U.S.c. S 101 (2018) r Whoevcr in\'Cnts or discovers any new and useful process, 
machine, manufactu re. orcomposilion of mailer. or any new and useful improvement thereof. may 
obtain a patent therefor, subje<:lto the conditions and requirements of th Is litle. ~). 
" While this description is likely broadly correct, there arc certain ly other factors besides the 
quality of the inventive idea tha t greally afl'ecllhe success or failure of products on the market . such 
as financing, quality of the embodiment of the idea. marketing, and network effects, inter alia. 
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Theo retically, th is limitation is keyed to what the applicant has actually 
invented- which is itself defined in reference to what was known in the 
art at the time the application was flied. The statute constrains patent 
scope by alloWing grant only for applicants who demonstrate that their 
claimed invention is new, useful , and non-obvious when compared to the 
prior art. 64 These requirements can be explained by reference to the goals 
of the patent system. Allowing someone to patent something that was 
already known- or, in patent parlance, is not novel- would either create 
competing rights with another patent-holder who had previously been 
granted purportedly-exclusive rights or it would take knowledge out of 
the public domain. Granting a second , identical patent wou ld replicate 
the nonrivalry problem that patent law attempts to solve. AlloWing a 
patent to cover already.known· but-unpatented material would grant a 
right whe re it was unnecessary to achieve innovation and unnecessarily 
ties up knowledge that ought to be in the public domain.6S The same logic 
applies to the requirement that an invent ion be non-obvious.66 The 
Supreme Court has explained that "[bloth the novelty and the 
non obviousness requirements of federal patent law are grounded in the 
notion thatcollcepts within the public grasp, or those so obvious that they 
readily could be, are the tools of creatio n available to all."67 The 
boundaries of patents are thus as important for what they leave out as for 
what they enclose. 
Property boundaries do not only serve the interests of the right 
holder. The duties that come with in rem rights in real and personal 
property are accompanied by relatively low information costs for others 
who come into contact with the land or goods so held. 6B For example, I 
do not need to know who owns a parcel of I and or in what form 69 in order 
.. Set: 3S U.S.c. S§ 101 - 103. 
~ Michael Abramowicz & John 1'. Duffy, TIle InducclllclIl Siandard of Pa tentability, 120 YALE 
1. 1. 1590, IS94 (20 11) . 
.. Id . 
.., Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc" 489 U.S. 14 1, 1S6 (1989) . 
.. For example, Penner explains that th ird parties do not need to ha\"C a personal relat ionship 
with a property owner to know that thei r duty is not to trespass. This is MOl simple, single duty, and 
very easy to comply with ,~ he argue!;, be<::ausc th ird part ies need only know that (here is an owner, 
"ilhout needing to learn details or identity, shared. ownership, or succession. JAM ES E. PE."NER, 
THE IDEA OF PROPERTY IN LAw 27 (Oarendon Press Oxford 1997) . 
.. For example: Is it a tenancy in common! Arc Ihere liens~ 
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to avo id trespassing- I simply need to recogni ze that the land is governed 
by property rules and that abse nt consent or some relevant limiting 
principle. I may not enter,iO Similarly, no member of the public needs to 
know precisely who owns a car that is parked by the road to know that 
she is not entitled to open the door and drive it away absent fi nding and 
obtaining consent from the owner,71 If the notice benefi ts to exclusionary 
rules appear obvious. that is the point. The ex istence of the car, together 
with the common knowledge that cars are a type of thing that is owned, 
tells passersby all they need to know about their own ri ghts (and duties) 
respecting the ca r. 72 This "common knowledge" that provides notice and 
allows people not to infringe on the exclusive rights of others is 
dependent on social understanding that the th ing in question is likely to 
be subject to such rights as well as where the borders of the protected good 
or land lies. Much of this knowledge is in tuitive and drawn from social 
context and the tangible nature of property. 
Patent boundaries are as important to th ird pa rty interests as for 
proper calibration of incentives to inventors. Consistent with other fo rms 
of property, patents and thei r boundaries serve a notice-giving function. 
They are publicly ava ilable and searchable with claims and disclosure that 
explain and delineate the scope of protection.i3 The disclosure adds to the 
store of public knowledge and allows others to build on what the inventor 
has discovered.i4 In addition. it gives notice to other innovators what is 
off limits. The various disclosure requirements in patent law seek to limit 
the scope of a patent to that which the patent enables others to make. but 
are also important because all that is not claimed is meant to be free for 
others to use. The Court acknowledged the importance of boundari es in 
Festo Corp. v. SllOketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabusltiki Co .• explaining that the 
monopoly rights in a patent are "property right (s]; and like any property 
right. its boundaries should be clear. This clarity is essen ti al to promote 
,. Michael A. Heller, Tilt Tragedy oflile Alllicommoll5; Property iII/lie TralUWOIlfrolll Marx to 
Marla:,s, III I-I ARV. L REV.621, 660 ( 1998) (discussing in tu iti\'e understanding of property rights). 
11 P E.'<NER,sllpra note68, at 25-28. 
n Id. at 84. 
7) RORERT P. M ERGES, P ETER S. M ENELL & M ARK A. LEMLEY, INTEllECTUAL P ROPERTY IN THE 
NEWTECHNOLQGICALAGE 14 (5th cd. 20 10) . 
.. Jeanne C. Fromer, Pa't'" Disc/osllre, 94 IOWA L REv. 539, 54 1 (2009); sa also Sean B. 
Seymore, The Teaclliflg Function of Palel/ls, 85 NOTRE D AME L REV. 62 1 (20 10). 
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progress, because it enables efficien t investmen t in innovation. "7S This 
importa nce is to both the inventor and third parties, the Court clari fies: 
"[a) patent holder should know what he owns, and the public shou ld 
know what he does not." i6 Disclosure requirements for patent holders 
serve to reduce information costs to third parties. servin g thi s notice 
function. 77 
The U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) does make errors in 
deciding whether to grant patents and what scope they should have. This 
reflects time constraints, the difficulty of defining rights ex ante over 
information that is by definition new, and the ex parte nature of patent 
application. In new fields of technology, it can he very difficult to properly 
defi ne and explain the scope of protection granted. The language used to 
describe the scope of an invention may not yet have agreed-upon 
meaning, and the person with the greatest understanding of the 
technology-the inventor- also has every incentive to get the broadest 
scope of protection possible. In addition, many- and likely most-
patents issued are never the subject oflicens ing or litigation, which means 
that spending inordinate amounts of time trying to define the scope of an 
inve ntion ex ante is inefficient. i8 Currently, fo r example. patent 
examiners spend an average of nineteen hours on each patent application 
from the time of filing until a final decision on patentability is made. 79 
Moreover, there are institutional incenti ves for patent examiners to 
"skew[]" decisions towards granting patents. so As a result, though the 
7) Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushilti Co., 535 U.S. 722, 730-3 1 (2002). 
,. Id. at 73 l. 
71 Long, supra note 27, at 469 n P)a tent applicants [must) exhaustively describe the attribu tes 
of their inventions in order to receive prott.'Ction ~ in order to ~Iowcr information costs for observers 
who want to avoid infringing the patentee's rights.~). 
,. Mark A. Lemley, RlltiollallgllorallCl!at the Patent Office, 95 Nlv. U. L REv. 1495, 1497 (2001) 
(arguing that ~[b)ecause so few patents arc ever asserted against a competitor, it is much cheaper 
for so>ciety to make detailed validity detenninations in those few caSC$ than to invest additional 
resources examining patents that will ne\'er be heard fTolll again-), 8uI lee Michael D. Frakcs & 
Melissa F. Wassennan, frmlit}llallgnoranu al 1111: Palelll Office, 72 VA-I'D. L REv. 975 (2019) 
(arguing that further in\'cstment in palent examination would be worthwhile). 
,.. Michael D. Frakcs & Melissa F. Wassennan, 111e Fa;/~-d Promiu of User Fees: Empirical 
E"idellu/rom jlle U.S. Patent and Trademark Office. I I J. EMf'lIUCAlLEGAlSTUD. 602 (20 14) . 
• Greg Reilly, Decoupling Plllenl Ltiw, 97 B.U.1.. REV. 55J, S60 (20 17); see also Melissa F. 
Wassemlan, TlreOrallgillg Guard of Palen I Law: Clrel'roll Defenmcefor Ille PTO, 54 WM. &MARY 
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patent examination process is by no means cursory, and issued patents 
are given a presumption of validity,sl it is also the case that patent 
in fringement trials frequently include d isputes over the scope of the 
patent claims and defenses asserting in validity of asserted patents and 
c1aims,s2 In 1981, Congress included provisions for post-grant challenges 
to patents on the basis of novelty and non-obviousness to be heard at the 
PTO. 83 More recently, these provisions were expanded in the America 
Invents Act 0(20 11.84 
C. Patents as Facilitators of Coordination and Transfer (Witll 
Limitations) 
As described above. exclusive rights in patentable ideas can 
encourage investment. although there are concomitan t interests in 
limiting the scope of a patent to what the inventor actually possessed and 
reducing notice costs to third pa rties. One way that inventors can reap 
the rewards from patenting is th rough sale or licensing of their protected 
ideas. Patents may also facilitate coordination that bridges the gap from 
inve ntion to the market and allows market participants to coordinate 
with each other. 85 Just as the owner of real property may rent it to tenants 
or sell the property, or the owner of a car might lease or sell the veh icle, a 
L. Rl:v. 1959.2014 (20 13) (because the Patent and Trademark Office'~ role is to grant patents, there 
are ·constan t one·way demands to issue p;llenlsn ). 
11 35 U.S.C. § 282 (20 18) ("A palent sha ll be presumed valid.n). 
II Jean O. Lanjouw & Mark Schankerman, Characteristics of PalC1I1 Utigiltioll: A Wi lldow 011 
Competitioll, 32 RAND J. ECON. 129 (2001) (approximately one percent of issued patents are 
challenged as invalid in courts); John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, f:mpirical Evidellce 011 the 
Validity of Litignted Palell15, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205 (1998) (approximately half of all challenged 
patents are invalidated) . 
... Act of De<:ember 12, 1980 (Bayh-Dole Act), Pub. l. No. 96·5 17, § 302, 94 Stat. 3015, 3015 
(codified as amended at 35 U.s.c. § 302 (20 18» . 
.. Leahy.Smith America Invents Act, Pub. 1.. No. 112·29. 125 Stat. 284 (20 11 ) (codified as 
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 311-329 (20 18». The America In\'Cnts Act includes processes for post· 
grant review of patents in the nim: months follOwing grant, for any reason, 35 U.S.c. § 324, along 
with an expanded inter partes review procCSli any tillle after grant, for nO\'elty and nonob\'iousness, 
id.§ 3!!. 
I) Stephen Yelderman, Coordillalioll·PoClised Patent Policy, 96 !I.U. 1.. REv. 1565. 1567 (20 16) 
(explaining that more recent views of patent purposes include their ability to facilita te coordination 
among di fferent entities). 
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patent holder may choose to license or sell her entitlement. Another 
manner of monetizing the entitlement is by sell ing goods embodying the 
inve ntio n- whether thi s means patented widgets or widgets made 
through a patented process, or by a patented machine. This wou ld be 
analogous to selling fruit from an orchard or using one's vehicle for a ride 
service. The first instances involve sales or leasing of the owned assets, 
whereas the second set involve sales of goods produced through use of 
the asset. 
Because patented in ventions need not- and cannot- be kept as 
trade secrets, inventors can approach investors or other entities to enter 
licensing deals knowing that disclosure won't compromise their rights. 
Th is coordination value of patents was part of the argument for the 
inclusion of intellectual property rights in the WTO Agreement. 86 
Developed countries argued that when companies we re confident their 
technology would be protected in a developing country. they were more 
likely to manufacture high-tech goods in those coun tries and more likely 
to engage in technology transfer. 87 Thus. in small scale collaboration and 
th rough larger-scale legislative and treaty-based actions, patents have 
been used to increase and d isseminate knowledge and encourage 
coll aboration. 
The potential for efficient transfer of property leads to another 
justification for exclusionary rul es: lowered information costs for third 
parties who interact with the property or are in a relevant market.88 A 
right in rem corresponds with duties for all others not to intermeddle 
with the property absent authorization.89 These duties, because they are 
general and attac h to the thing itself do not require any personal 
• Peter lee, Tmusceudiug the Tacit Dimeusion: Pa/eu/s, Relalitmsltips. aud Orgauizcalioutli 
[ulegmtiou iu Techuology Tmusfer, 100 CAUF. 1.. REv. 1503 (20 12). 
ID See. e.g., id . 
• Sm ith , supra note I, at 1746-47 (M Property rests on a foundation of simple rules like trespass 
that tell duty-holders to keep off. No direct reference need be made to information about either the 
duty-holder or the o\\-ner. if I am ""alking th rough a parking 1ot,I know not to d rive off with others' 
cars, and I do not need to know who the owners are, how virtuous (or not) they are, or .... hether 
they are actual people o r corporations. ") . 
.. RlOiARD A. EpSTEtN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 14- 15 ( 1993) (citing Wesley N. 
Hohfdd, Some Fllndamental Legal ConceptiOlls as Applit-d ill Judicial Reasoning, n YALE LJ. 16 
( 1913), fo r the proposition that Mthe c reation and re<:ognition of a right or privi lege in one person 
will impose correlat ive obligations on o thers"). 
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in teraction with a right holder o r even knowing who holds the right. This 
coord ination is possible because of the protection patents allow for 
di sclosed information . but also because patent rights may be licensed or 
sold. Under American law, patents a re alienable; in particular, the law 
states th at "patents shall have the attributes of personal property."90 Th is 
means that an inventor can license or sell her patent to those who may 
put it to a better use. The transfer m ay be recorded with the PTO.91 
A utilitarian view suggests that clear entitlement rules allow those 
with the best information about the value of rights to negotiate for their 
use or avoid infringement. 92 However, many go fu rther and suggest that 
broad exclusionary rules also a id with alienation of property and resale 
markets. In rem rights and other property formalities can facilitate 
efficien t exchanges by allowing m arket participants to contract for rights 
with an understand ing of what they wi ll receive and some ce rtainty about 
its fo rm and scope.93 Because rights are held generally and aga inst a large 
class of people, the transfer of title can transfer the right as to all the duty-
holders at once. Thus, not only are the exclusive rights associated with 
property regi mes helpful to observers who wish to avoid infringe ment of 
rights, they also reduce transaction costs for those who seek "to enter into 
negotiations wi th the property owner over it, and to build on it. "94 
O ne limitation on structuring the transfe r of patent rights is the first 
sale doctrin e, also kn own as patent exhausti on. The underlyi ng premise 
• 35 U.S.C. § 261 (2013). 
OJ Id. 
Ol Smilh, supm note I, at 1747-43 (~[ I Jf we are worrkd about creators, inventors, 
commercializers, and others not being able to appropriate the returns from their activit ies, we 
might respond to these positi\'e externalities with subsidies or rigllts to those inputs. But although 
these more dired solutions are obviously superior on the benefit side-and they have certainly for 
this reason garnered a lot of support in the foml of proposals for rewards and compulsory 
licensing-they also by their very directness are more costly than exdush'e rights. The al ternati\"C 
to these tailored solutions is to devise rights that rely on simple on/off signals and that will allow 
rights-holders to reap the returns from their inputs wi thout officials' nceding to value the uses to 
which the inputs are put-or even to know whatthosc uses are. · ). 
'J Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Oplimll/ SMm:illrdiwliOlr i ll lire l ll w of Property: Tire 
Numrms atWS" S Prillciple, 11 0 YALE LJ. I (2000) . 
.. long, slIpm note 27, at 476. Long goes on to explain that there are also infornlation costs 
associated with learning about the contours and substance of the right and a second order cost in 
deciding how much to invest in learning about the right before making a decision on how to 
proceed-costs that may be part icularly high in the intcllcctual property context. Id. at 476-77. 
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is fa irly simple- that once a particular, patented thing is the subject of an 
au thorized sale. the patent holder's rights are exhausted, and any futu re 
use or sale of that particular th ing cannot be infringing. 95 This limitation 
applies to the second type of rights exploitation described above-
namely. sales of goods that embody a patented idea. The exhaustion 
doctrine is a limitation on the rights granted by a U.S. patent, balancing 
patent holders' contractual freedom to construct licenses with 
downstream users' interests in their lawfully obtained property.96 The 
expansion of patent exhaustion to foreign sales, di scussed below, comes 
at the expense of U.S. patent holders who prefer the ability to control the 
first sale of patented goods within the United States. Those who have 
argued against exhaustion - whether in the domestic or in ternational 
context- have often appealed to the patent holder's freedom to structure 
contracts and licenses as she wishes, suggest ing tha t this freedom will 
result in more price discrimination, allOWing patent holders to reap a 
higher reward while also making goods available to more consumerS.97 
This freedom is an extension of the domin ion a patent holder shou ld hold 
over that which she has created and staked out, accord ing to th is view. 
Furthermore, allowing such freedom may result in the most efficien t 
allocation of the rights associated with the patent. 
os Joh n Duffy and Richard l'lynes argue that the sale takes a patented good out of patent law's 
domain. and that the doctrine of exhaustion merely recogni7.es this delineation of the domain in 
which patents operate as compared to that in which contract or property law do. John F. Duffy & 
Richard Hynes, Sill/II/ory Domiliu llud the Commercial Law of lulellce/lm/ Properly. 102 VA. L REV. 
1 (2016) . 
.. Sarah R. Wasserman RajI'<, Free Trnde ill Palerrled Goods; IlIle"'llliolllll Ex/lilllSlion for 
Patents. 29 BERKELEY T ECH. LJ. 317 (2014) . 
., Sl:e Vincent Chiappetta, Pa/ell/ Exllilll5lioll: Wlral s II CoOOd For? 5 1 SA~'-nA o.ARA L REV. 
1087. 111 8-22 (20 11). In the international context, see, e.g., David A. Malueg & Marius Schwartz, 
Pamllellmports, Demllnd Di5persiorr, ilnd Inlenrilliolla/ Priu [)jscrimirralioll . 37 ). I1<..,.·L Eco~. 167, 
17 1 (1994) (suggesting that an international exhaustion rule in patent law would cause patent 
holdcl'$ either to raise prices ahroad or to decline to sell in low-income markets). Sce also Pinelopi 
Koujianou Goldberg. Intellectllal Properly Rig/liS Prolectioll ill fk"'elopirrg Corm/rics: 11re Case of 
Pllilrmacell/iwls, 8 J. EuR. EcoN. Ass'!\' 326. 329-30 (20 10) (arguing that pharmaceutical 
companies might not serve low-income countries or may raise prices there if there is paralJeI 
import ing). 
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O. Property a"d Liability Rufes ill Patent Enforcement and Remedies 
Remedies for patent infringement include compensatory damages 
for past infringement and injunctions against future infringemen t.98 
Because the core of the patent right is exclusion. injunctive reli ef is often 
also seen as a core means of remedying infringement- thereby 
vindicating a patent holder's deci sion not to authorize an acc used 
infringer's behavior. However, like with other exclusive rights, courts 
may deny injunctions- and following the 2006 decision in eBay, denials 
have become more frequent. The reasoning and theoretical impact of 
re medial doctrines is discussed further, below. In this Section describing 
the contours of patent grants, remedies, and limitations, it is simply worth 
noting that injunctions are generally seen as a stronger remedy than 
money damages, providing rights protection through a property rule 
rathe r than a liability rule.99 
II. REJECfJONSAND liMITATIONS OF PROPERTY LAW FRAMI NG FOR 
PATENTS 
Property law analogies explain man y decisions about paten t grants, 
rul es about the transfer of goods, and remedial rules. However, in a 
number of recent cases, the Supreme Court has rejected strict, real 
property-based solutions to patent di sputes. In ch ronological order, 
recent examples are the Court's rulings on the availability of permanent 
injunctions as remedies, its willingness to expand the exhaustion 
doctrine, and the affirmance of post-grant administrative review as 
constitutional. In each case, advocates for a ru le driven by a strong 
property rights vision of patent rights argued that a deviation would have 
disastrous results for patent law. And in each case the Court ruled against 
the p roperty rights view of patent law-at least in its strong form. These 
rulin gs are not entirely inconsisten t with property rules- and to some 
ex tent can be explained by its internal exceptions and limitations. In 
• There is no provision in the statute for restitut ionary damages.. For one suggestion of the 
desirability of unjust enrichment damages. see John M. Golden & Karen F_ Sandrik. A Reslilulion 
Perspatil'e on RoosOl lllble RO)Yllties, 36 REv . UnG. )35 (201 7). 
" Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamoo, Property Rules, Liability Rules, a"d '"alienability : 
O"e View of the OIthedral, 85 HARV. 1.. REV. 1089 ( 1972). 
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ruling against the property rights view, the Court conSisten tly 
emphasized th ird party interests. This Pa rt describes the contexts in 
which these cases were decided and shows how. in each. the Court found 
that the property rights ve rsion of patent law interpretation- as 
presented- was inadequate in accounting for third party interests. 
A. Remedies 
The property rights view of patents took its first major hit in the area 
of patent in fringement remedies. In 2006, the Supreme Court issued its 
decision in eBay,iOO a case bringing the property rules versus li ability rules 
debate to patent law. 10] Property rights advocates!02 as well as bio and 
pharmaceutical industry representatives H») argued that infringement of 
the righ t to exclude granted by a patent can only be remedied through the 
grant of a permanent injunction .l<H This argument was based on a reading 
of a real property precedents, where den ial of injunctive relief is rare, IOS 
and the suggestion that because the right to exclude is the only right 
,. eBay Inc. v. MereU-change, U.C, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). 
"' Calabresi & Melamed, sl/pra note 99. 
,~ Peter S. Mcneil, 11u~ Properly Riglllj MOI'emenJ's EmbfYIcc o/lntel/CCII/1I1 Properly: Tn,e LOI'e 
or f)oomed Rdlltiom/lip?, 34 EcOLOGY JpQ. 713, 716 (2007) (deSCribing and cri tiquing the 
movement of property rights advocates in to patent law, explaining that "It ]he r&y case and the 
property rights rhetoric surrounding it marked an important new front in the campaign to establish 
a stric t and broad in terpretation of property rights and their enforcement"). 
,IJ The industries arguing in favor of injunctive relief included the biopharmaceutical industry, 
SOllie tradi tional industries, and non-practicing entities. Brief of Biotechnology Indus. Org. as 
Amid Curiae in Support of Respondent , eBay IIIC., 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 639162; 
Brief of Amicus Curiae Pharm. Research & Mfg. of America in Support of Respondent, dkly In,;., 
547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 622122; Brief for Gen. Elee. Co., 3M Co., Procter & Gamble 
Co., E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., & Johnson & Johnson as Amid Curiae Suggesting 
Affirmance, c&y IIIC., 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130), 2006 \\' 1. 615158; Brief Amid Curiacof Martin 
Cooper, Raymond Damadian, !.eroy Hood, Nathan Myhrvold, Robert Rines, Burt Rutan, James 
West, Fourteen Other Inv'rs, & Intellectual Ventures in Support of Respondent, cBay III';', 547 U.s. 
388 (No. 05· 130), 2006 \VL639161. 
, .. See, e.g., Brief of Various Law & Econ. Professors as Amid Curiae in Support of Respondent, 
e&ry III';', 547 U.S. 388 (No. 05-130), 2006 WI.639164. 
'e Mcneil, mpm note 102, at 716; Henry E. Smith, Proper/yas ale l.aw orl1lillgs, 125 HARV.l.. 
REv. 1691, 1713-15 (2012) (discussing how injunctions for continuing trespasses arc presumed in 
property law, while noting tha t unclean hands or wi ll fu lness may ret negate a plain tiffs claim for 
injunction). 
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gra nted by a patent, enforcement of that exclusion through injunctive 
relief is even more important than in the case of property rights in land 
and the multiple rights included in that grant. 106 O n the other side. 
representatives of the software and high tech industries,107 scholars,l08 
and public interest organizations H)9 argued for an increased role for 
liability rules-leading to money damages rather than injunctions- in 
situations li ke ly to otherwise result in holdup. ll0 The Court issued a 
unanimous opinion professing merely to reaffirm that patent law is 
bound by the same, traditional rules of equity as are other areas of law. III 
In reality, the hvo concurrences laid out different visions of when and 
whether a permanent injunction is an appropriate remedy for patent 
infringement, with the Kennedy concurrence drawing a map courts have 
used to deny permanent injunctio ns in favor of liability rules in some 
circumstances.ll2 Since the Court issued its eBay opinion, courts are 
,. Smith,5rlpm nOle lOS. 
,.,. Set, e.g .. Brief of Am. InnovatOl"$' All. as Amicus Curiae in Support ofPetitionel"$ at 25-30, 
tIkry Itre., 547 U.S. 383 (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 218967, at '25-30; Brief of Amicus Curiae Yahoo! 
In(:". in Support of Petitioner at 5-14, cBay Ilrc., 547 U.S. 338 (No. 05- 130), 2006 WL 218988, at '5-
14: llrief ofln!,1 Bus. Mach. Corp. as Amici Curiae in Support ofNeithcr Party at 16-18.e&y IIIC., 
547 U.S. 338 (No. 05- 130), 2006 WL 235006, at '16-1 8. 
,. See, e.g., llrief Amici Curiae of Fifty- two Intelle<:tual Prop. Professors in Support of 
Pct itionersa t 7, eIkry IIIC., 547 U.s. 388 (No. 05- 130), 2006 WI. 1785363, at '7. 
,. See, e.g., Brief of Elec;:. Frontier Found., Pub. Patent Found., Am. Ass'n of Law Libraries, Am. 
Library Ass'n & Special Libraries Ass'n as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, ellay IIIC., 547 
U.s. 388 (No. 05-130), 2006 WL 235008. 
110 Sec, e.g., Brief Amici Curiae of Fifty-two Intellectual Prop. Professors in Support of 
Petitioners, 5upm note 108, at 7; Mark A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Pl,tellt Holdup (wd Royalty 
Slackillg, 85 TEX. !~ REV. 1991,2015 (2007) (arguing tha t theTt~ is a high risk foreomp!ex inventions 
and that non-practidng entities bring a significant portion of infringement suits in industries with 
complex goods often co\'ered by multiple patents). 
"' The opinion references the Klradi tional~ nature of the four· factor test for equitable relief in 
nea rly every paragraph of the five- page opinion and it figures in each of the concurrences twice. 
elJay IIIC., 547 U.S. 388. For a critique of the Court's claim that its opinion merely Kupheld 
traditional principles~ and an explanation of the case's impact in other areas of law, see Mark P. 
Gergen et aI., Tile Supreme COllrf'l Accidental Revo/utioll? n,e Test for Permallelll/lljullctioll5, 112 
COLUM. L REV. 203 (2012). 
II I elJay IIIC., 547 U.S. at 394-95 (Roberts, C.l., concurring); id. at 395-97 (Kennedy, I., 
concurring); 5U FED. TRADE COMM'N, THE EVOLVING IP MAIt)(ETI'1.ACE: AUGS'tNG PATE~T 
NOTtCE AND RE,\iEDIES WITH CoMI'ETITIOS' 217 (2011) (showing that post-elJay -district courts 
have granted approximately 72%-n% of pcnnanent injunction n'quests~); Christopher II. Scaman, 
Ollgoillg Ra)'tlllies ill Ptl/ell/ Cases After ellay: All £mpirirol AS5CSSmclIl alld Proposed Framework, 
23 TEX. I ~'TEU.. PItOI'. L J. 203, 204 (20 15) (~[ Al substantial number of prevailing patentees have 
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likel ier to deny permanent injunctions in specific contexts.1\3 These 
contexts, taken en masse, occur when the misfi t between patent law and 
property rights is greatest. That is, the separation between the 
information protected by the patent and the infringing things that 
embody that information involve property- type interests of both the 
patent holder and third-party innovators. In the injunction context, the 
misfit is further exacerbated by the public interest in access to innovation 
that is an integral part of the patent balance. l14 
The Court's decision in eBay reflects years of increasing concern 
about two emerging problems-"slispec t patents and suspect 
entities"lIS-that hindered innovation by third parties when coupled with 
the widespread availability of permanent injunctions as a remedy for 
infringement. Improvidently granted and overbroad patents can lead to 
potential holdup problems, particularly in the information technology 
and softw'are fields,ll6 as can patents fo r small compo nents o f complex, 
been denied !he abi1i!y!O e:cdude fu!ure acts of infringement !hrough the court's COn!emp! power 
for the firs! time: ). Blit sec Ryan T. Holte & Christopher B. Seaman, Patellt IlIjllllctiolls all Appeal; 
All Empirical Stlldyofthc Feticml CirwitsApplicalioll ofeHay, 92 W ASH . L REv. 145 (20\7) (noting 
tha t the Federal Circuit is more likely to reverse a district court 's decision to deny an injunction 
than a decision to enter an injunction, proViding some limitation on the effects of cBay on 
injunction denial). 
'" See Holte & Scaman,SZlpm note 11 2. 
,,. Sarah R. Wasserman Rajec, 1izilorillg Remedies to Spur ImlO,'aIiOlr, 6 1 AM. U. L REV. 733, 
750-5 1 (20 12) (arguing that the public in terest prong of the four-factor test for injunctions best 
captures the public in terest concerns in access that arc evident in the Justice Kennedy's eBay 
concurrence). 
,,~ Id. at 743. 
,,' Sec, c.g., Pamela Samuelson, llcnson RI!1'15lted: The Que Agaillst Patellt Pro/celiOIl for 
Algoritlrm5 alld Otlrer Computer Program-Related III~elltio/15, 39 t:MORY 1..1. 1025, 1028-30 (1990) 
(debating the desirabili ty of allOwing patents for computer programs and algori thms). Patents on 
methods of doing bUSiness-particularly those that took known methods and claimed rights over 
performing those methods on computers-<omprised one type of wsuspcct paten t ~ with the 
potential to chill competitors from perfonning acts that were fairly obvious adoptions of new 
technology to perfoml old processes. For discussions of business method patents, see, e.g., FED. 
TRADE CoMM'N, To PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER HALAKCE OF COMPETITION A"'O 
PATENT LAw AND POllCY I-55 (2003): Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Arc 811Sllless Met/rod Patelll5 
8nd for 8I1S;m!S5?, 16 SAl'o.'TA CI.A.RA CoMPtrrER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263 (2000): Michael J. Meurer, 
Brlsiuess Metlrod Piltellts alld Pellellt Floods, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & POl'Y 309, 334- 36 (2002) (arguing 
tha t Ihe Supreme Court should reverse Stilte Street Balik and revive the exemption on the 
paten tabi lity of business methods). 
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multipart technologies such as semiconductor chips. 1I7 This is because a 
failure to license even one component could result in a permanent 
injunctio n against the sale of an entire product. The threat of an 
injunction in such cases functions as a holdup, allowing a patent holder 
to extract a much higher royalty than the relative value of their 
contribution. At the same time. suspect entiti es alternately called trolls, lIB 
non-practicing entities, 119 and patent-assertion entiti es1 20 emerged to 
leverage suspect patents for litigati on value and to leverage component 
patents for higher returns than their contributions merited. The business 
model of these companies, still relatively new at the turn of the century, 
is generally to amass-but-not-practice a portfolio of patents. The sole 
purpose of this portfolio is licensing to practicing entities, using the threat 
of a permanen t injunction to extract fees tied to the value of the entire 
product- or to the cost of defensive litigation- rather than the value of 
the patented invention itself. The opposition to routine grants of 
injunctions was thus driven by concerns about innovation- and 
pa rticularly innovation by third parties. The high risk of in fringement 
and the potential for artificially high licenSi ng costs raise the cost of 
innovation, wh ich are passed on to consumers. III In this context, 
industries, academics, and the government noted the potential ill effects 
'" Wasscmlan Rajec, SlIpm note 114, at 743-45~ see also Carrier, slIpm note)2, at 17 (further 
noting that products with many and overlapping patents may result in longer effective patent 
terms). 
u l The term "patent trol1" wascoined by then-Assistan t General Counsel for Inlel. Peter Detkin, 
in 1999. Sec, e.g .. Edward Wyatt , IIlI'Clltil'c, al Least ill Courl, N.Y. TIM ES (july 16, 2013), 
htlps:llwww·.nytimes.com/20 I3I071l7/business/ftc . turns-a-lens-on-abulICrs-of- thc-patcnt-
system.html [htlps:llpcrma.cc/ACY6. 1'5 B9]; III re Packard. 75 1 P.3d 1307. 1325 (I'ed. Cir. 2014) 
(Plager, J., concurring) (per curiam) (detailing the various names by which · patent trolls · are 
known)~ see also John M. Golden, ~Patellt Trolls· and Patent RemCllies. 85 TEX. L REv. 211 t , 2112-
14,2 112 n.7 (2007) (noting that thedefinition of"palent troW often shifts, depending on a speaker's 
rhetorical purposes). 
u. See Colleen V. Chien, From Amls Race 10 Markelplace; 111e Cemplex Palelll Ecosyslem alld 
Its implim/iolls for Ihe Palellt S)'5tem, 62 HASTINGS L J. 297, 326-28 (20 10) (explaining that while 
descriptive, the tern) ~non-praaicing entities" may be over-indusive, capturing actors like 
univcrsities and rcsearch and development groups that do not engage in troll· like behavior). I. Id. at 328 (~ Patcnt-asscrtion enti lies arc focused on thc cnforcement, rather than the act;'·c 
dcvclopmcnt or commercialization of their patents. -). 
III To PROMOTE It-.'KOV ATIOl': n {E PROPER OALANCE OfCOMPETITIOS AND PATE."'lT U.W AND 
POliCY, supra notc 116, at 38-41 (explaining that highcr royalt ies paid means higher prices for 
consumcrs. which results in low product usc and deadweight on the market). 
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of suspect patents and suspect en tities on innovation and looked to courts 
to curb these forces. 
Before eBay, courts routinely issued perm anent injunctions 
fo ll oWing a finding of patent infringement. 122 The issuance of a 
permanent injunction is consistent with the patent's co re right of 
exclusion- it is a court order validating the patent holder's interest in 
controlling who is authori zed to make, use, sell, offer for sale, or import 
a patented in vention. Under a real property remedy framework, patent 
in fr ingement looks a lot li ke trespass. The trespass analogy became 
particula rly relevant to the discussion about remedies for patent 
infringement, and the availability of injunctions in pa rticuiar. 123 From a 
real property perspective, an injunction might be an order forbidding a 
trespasser from future trespass; or, for private property, o rderi ng the 
return of a possession from its taker. And proponents of strong property 
righ ts in patents argued that the rarity of denying injunctions for trespass 
against real property ought to be recreated in paten t law. From this view, 
injunctions make particular sense in paten t law because of the diffic ulty 
in prospectively valU ing info rmation that preViously didn 't exist. As a 
result. patent holders may be the best arbiters of their in ventions' worth. 
As with other areas of law, th is informational asym metry means that 
injunctions will often result in patents being put to their best use. 124 
The rarity of injunctions under property rules is contested by others 
who argue that the limitations on injunctions in property law are more 
robust than the property rights proponents suggest. and therefore might 
provide sufficient channels to address the inefficiencies injun ctions can 
cause in patent law. us In this vein , Michael Ca rrier discusses multiple 
I jj Wasserman Raje.:, supm note 114, at 741 (" Before the Supreme Court decided c&iy, 
permanent injunctions were routinely granted following a finding ofinfringemcnt."). 
1/.1 Mencll , supra note 102, at 716 (d iscussing thc property rights movcmcnt's vicws on 
injunctive relief in patent law through the filing of an amicus bricf. ~By analogizing patent 
protection to tr~pass law, the brief argued that injunctive relief should be presumcd in cases of 
patcnt infringcmcnt. It pushed the boundaries of patent law advocacy by citing land cncroachment 
precedent"). 
OJ. Calabresi & Melamed,5upra note 99,at I 106-1 0;5te ROGElt D. BLAtR& THOMAS F. CarrER, 
INTEU.ECI"UAL PROPERTY: EcOKOMIC AND LEGAL DIME."SlONS OF RIGHTS AND R.E.M.EDIFS 38-42 
(2005) (arguing that injunct ive rel ief should be thc gencral default remedy for patent infringement 
for the trad itional reasons property rules are seen to trump liabili ty niles). 
I j) See gCI1l':m lly Carrier, mpm note 32, at 83 (arguing that limits are a crucial part of property 
righu and showing how those limits can apply to the increasingly propert i7.ed fields of intelle.:tual 
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limitations on the right to exclude in real property, includ ing equitable 
limitations fo r minimal encroachments. good fa ith improvements, 
boundary line d isputes, and public accommodations. inter alia. 
suggesting that patent law might sim il arly introduce limitations on 
inj unction grants consistent with property ful es. l26 Similarly, John 
Golden suggests that a presumption of an injun cti on need not preclude 
occasional deni als. 127 Many of those arguin g against routine grants of 
injuncti ons suggest that injunctions are nevertheless very often the 
appropriate remedy for a findin g of patent ill frin geme nt. 1 2~ 
Given how battle lines were drawn, the outcome cou ld be 
characteri zed as a victory of liability rules over property rules. The 
Supreme Court was unanimous in its reversal of the Federal Circuit in 
eBay, explai ning that there should be no "au to matic" grant of injunctions; 
instead, cou rts m ust engage in a four-facto r balanci ng test fo r every case. 
But despite the unan imity o f the ma in opin ion, it was the context-specific, 
utilitarian view of patents that won out over the strong property rights 
view in eBay. The h'/o concurrences presented separate views, with Chief 
Justice Roberts, joined by Justices Scalia and Gi nsburg, suggesting that 
history and precedence should result in frequent grant of injunctions. '29 
In contrast, Justice Kennedy, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and 
Breyer, pen ned a concurrence recognizing the new contexts in which 
patent holders were bringing suits and requestin g inj unction s . '~ In 
partic ular, the concurrence noted the harm that permanent injunctions 
could cause when coupled with the types of suspect patents or entities 
discussed above.13I Justice Kenn edy thus suggested that courts should 
property law and concluding that .[i]f property, which effective ly serves more gools than [ I', can 
offer meaningful limi ts. then so can 1p· ). 
II' fd. at 73-75. 
II' Golden, supra note 118, at 2148-49 (suggesting that M[C[ourts could apply a rebu ttable 
presumption of injuncth-e relief' while retaining an abili ty 10 slay or to deny injunctions to avoid 
·undue hardship· ). I. Wasserman Rajec, 511pra note 114, at 782 (arguing that taking acCC'$S in terests into account 
to deny injunctions Mwould not lead to wholesale denial of injunctions·). 
Ilf cBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388. 395 (2006) (Roberts. c.J., concurring). 
, .. fd. at 396 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
1)1 fd. 
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consider "'the nature of the patent being enfo rced and the economic 
function of the patent holder."l31 
Since the Court issued its eBay opinion, courts still issue injunctions 
to competitors,133 but have denied injunctions to non-practicing entities 
more frequently.l14 Moreover, denials of in junctions are most likely when 
the types of concerns detailed in the Kennedy concurrence exist. Thus, 
when the patent holder is a patent assertion entity and the injunction 
threatens the ability of a practicing entity to participate in the market. an 
injunction is less likely to issue. It is possible to read eBay as consistent 
with a private property law view of patents, partic ularly as the unanimous 
opinion insisted it was affirming that the longstanding equitable test for 
injunctions applied to patents, as to other areas of law.l)s The Court 
reinvigorated the rubric for deciding on remedies in any given case, and 
many patent infringement claims result in the grant of permanent 
injunctions. However. it is hard not to see the outcome as the first blow 
in a series of setbacks to those who argue that a private property rights 
view must bring with it the strong version ofthose prope rty rights. There 
is no presumption of entitlement to an injunction. and parties must prove 
more than simply the fact of a patent and its infringement in order to 
receive one. 
As discussed in Parts III and IV below. courts' willingness to look 
for answers beyond the strong version of a private property rights 
IJl Id. 
l JJ Sec, e.g., Douglas Dynamics, l. tC v. Buyers Prods. Co., 717 F.3d 1336, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2013) 
(reversing district court's denial of an injunction to a competitor in the market, even when there 
was no loss of market share); Robert Bosch LLC v. Pylon Mfg. Corp., 659 F.3d 1142, 11 51 (Fed. Cir. 
20 II ) (rcversing district court's denial of injunction and holding that irreparablc injury may be 
found even when there are multiple infringers in market); 02 Micro Jnt'l Ltd. v. Beyond Innovation 
Tech. Co., 449 F. App'x 923, 932 (Fed. Cir. 20t 1) (affirming grant of injunction to direct competitor 
that suffered I05S of market share); i4i Ltd P'ship v. Microsoft Corp., 598 F.3d 83 1, 861 (I'ed. Cir. 
2010), affd, 564 U.s. 9 t (20 11) (affinning grant of injunction when Microsoft's infringement 
rendered i4i's product obsolete, thereby resulting in a loss of market share). 
114 Seesupm note 112. In addition, courts and the legislature hll\"e taken aim at ~suspect· patents 
in a number of ways. The Supreme Court 's renewed atten tion to patentable subject mailer has 
raised the standard for patentability of algori thm.based in\·ention.s or other im'entions directed 
to .... 'ards abstract ideas. The legislature's passage of the America In\'ents Act and the expansion of 
post-grant review discussed in Section IV.A al$O demonstrate a concern that invalid patents should 
be easier and cheaper to challenge. See d iscussion infra Section IV.A. 
,» See e&y 1m:., 547 U.s. at 391 ("11lcsc fa miliar principles apply wilh equal force 10 disputes 
arising under the Patent Acl. ~) . 
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framework can be explained by the greater misfit in the contexts 
specifically mentioned in the Kennedy concurrence. Where th is sea rch 
ends, and whether it fits into the framework of limitations that apply to 
private property is a different question. The nature of the limitation may 
find its roots in property theory, l36 or it may derive from a more 
regulatory and utilitarian analysis of a palent's costs and benefits to 
society and third-party inventors137-but it is d ear that the Court will not 
take the private property rights story as the beginning and end of the 
inquiry. 
B. Patent Exhaustion as Limitation on Coordination and Transfer 
Another area in which private property law interpretations of patent 
law have been challenged relates to limitatio ns on patent holder control 
over resale markets. The exhaustion doctrine- or the doctrine of fi rst 
sale- provides that the first authorized sale of a patented good exhausts 
the patent holde r's rights with respect to that good. IJB In recent cases, the 
Court has limited patent holders' control over downstream sales and 
expanded exhaustion to extraterritorial sales. l19 The relatively expansive 
in terpretation of exhaustion has been tempered, however, by allowing for 
greater con trol through li censing for goods that are easil y and perfectly 
replicable. 140 
In 2008, the Court decided Quanta Computer Inc. v. LG Electronics, 
Inc., holding that patent exhaustion applied to patented methods 
practiced in chipsets that were the subject of authori zed sales by Intel to 
Quanta. !4 t In that case, LG Electronics granted Intel a license to method 
' ,)00 5«sllpm notes 126- 127. 
IS> !ke 5IIpm nOle \32 and accompanying discussion. 
I"", Wasserman Raje<: , supra nole 96, at 320. 
I,. !ke Impression Prods., Inc. v. i.eJ:mark Inl'l, Inc .. 137 S. Ct. 1523 (20 17) (applying CJ[haustion 
to aulllOrized sales abroad); Quanta Comput., Inc. v. l.G f.lccs .. 553 U.S. 617 (2008) (applying 
exhaustion to nUllify restricti\'e licenses accompanying a sale). 
I.!ke Bowman v. Monsanto Co. , 569 U.S. 278 (201 3) (upholding Monsanto's restrictive 
licensing agreement that accompanied the sale of $CCds). In the copyright context, the Second 
Circuit recen tly held there was infringement when a digital platfoml allowed Kresale~ of Kused~ 
digi tal music files because the te<:h nological means of complcling the sale involved making new, 
unauthorized copies. Capitol Re<:ords, U,C v. ReDigi Inc., 9 \0 F.3d 649, 655-56 (2d Cir. 2018), 
,., Qzum la, 553 U.S. at 621 , 624. 
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patents that would be practiced in chipsets Intel designed. 142 The license 
pe rm itted Intel to manufacture, use, sell. and im port products that 
practiced the patent. In a separate agreement, In tel agreed to notify its 
customers that its Il cense d id not allow fo r combining Intel products with 
non -Intel products. Quanta purchased chipsets from Intel and combined 
them with other products in a com puter. The Court held that Intel's 
authori zed sales to Quanta exhausted the patent holder's ri ghts. refusing 
LG's attempts to enforce the license on downstream purchasers. The 
Qual1 ta Court showed concern that allowing use restrictions to 
accompany method patents would allow for "an end-run around 
exhaustion" and "violate the longstanding principle that, when a patented 
item is 'once lawfully made and sold, there is no restriction on its use to 
be im plied for the benefit of the patentee. "'L43 
Then, in 2013, the Court add ressed self- replica ting technology in 
Bowman v. Monsanto Co. 1« The Co urt held that exhaustion allowed the 
purchaser of patented seeds to use-Le., plant- them, but did not allow 
those seeds to be used to make "new copies of the patented in vention" by 
growing a fi rst generation of soy, harvesting the beans, and planting those 
in order to grow a second generation.14s In its holding, the Court 
distin guished betw"een a patent holder's right in a "particul ar" a rticle that 
was sold and the patent holder's right to exclude others from "making" 
new articles that embody the patent. l46 Conversely, from the purchaser's 
perspecti ve, the Court affirm ed its line of cases holding there is a right to 
use or sell a particular article that was purchased, but did not extend this 
ri ght to allow the production of more patented articles. lH 
" I [d. at 623. Thc case also madc clcar that sales of goods that cmbody a mcthod patcnt rcsult 
in cxhaust ion, just as salcs of goods that cmbody a product patent do. Id. at 628. 
'" fd. at 629-30 (altera tion and emphasis omitted) (quoting Adams v. Burke, 84 U.S. 453, 457 
(1873». 
I .. f./owmulI, 569 U.S. 278. Seeds are, by na ture, self.replica ting. Monsanto protc-cts its patented 
seeds through a licensing agreement that allows growers to plant the sccd.s, but forbids saving 
subsequently harycsted soybeans to replant or resell for planting. 
14) Id. at 280. 
I .. Id. at 284 (quoting Uni ted States v. Uni\'is Lens Co" 316 U.S. 241,251 (1942». 
IQ Id. (-['nhe purchaser of the [patented) machine ... docs not acquirc any right to construct 
another machine ei thcr for his own usc or to be vended to another. - (quoting Mitchell \'. Ha\\~cy, 
83 U.s. 544. 548 (1873))). 
1892 CARDOZO LA W REVIEW [Vol. 4U859 
In 2017, the Supreme Court extended exhaustion to fo reign sales of 
patented goods in Impression Products 111c. v. Lexmark International, 
111c. L48 As a result. a U.S. patent holder's rights in her patent are exhausted 
by an authorized fore ign sale of goods, and the importation of those 
goods does not constitute infringement. l49 Prior to Lexmark, exhausti on 
applied to domesti c, but not international, sales. ISO This means that prior 
to Lexmark. consumers buying indistin gui shable, used goods in the 
United States might infringe patents, depending on whether those goods 
were first sold abroad or domestically. The general debates over patent 
exhaustion within the United States were echoed during the lead up to 
the Lexmark opinion, with the add ition of considerations that were 
unique to international trade law. 151 Some were particula rly concerned 
that eliminating the possibili ty for price discrimination would result in 
higher prices and lower access abroad .152 In ho lding that there is 
, .. Impression Prods., Inc. v.l..e;l:mark Int'I. Inc.. 137 S. Ct. 1523 (20 17). 
,ft Id. al 1535. 
,100 Boesch v. Graff, 133 U.s. 697. 703 ( 1890) (find ing no exhaustion of U.S. patent rights as a 
result of a German sale that was not authorized by the patent holder, although it .... '35 lawful in 
Gemlany at the time due to prior user rights in that country); Fuji Photo Film Co. v. Jau Photo 
Corp .. 394 F.3d 1368. 1376 (fed. Cir. 2005); Jau Photo Corp. v. Int'I Trade Comm'n, 264 F.ld 1094. 
1105 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (MUnited States patent rights are not exhausted by products of foreign 
provenance. To invoke the protection ofthe first sale doctrine, the authorized first sale must ha\'e 
occurred under the United States patent.~ (citing /jocsch, 133 U.S. at 701 - 03». Software is another 
field that is easily repl icated and in \~hich licenses often rep lace sales because they allow rights 
holders greater control over further copying and distribution. For a di~cu~s ion ofthesc factors, see 
Wasserman Rajec, slipra note 96, at 345-48 ("[TJhese factors result in greate r in terest in licenSing 
for easily replicable and self-replicating technologies.M ). 
UI Sec, e.g., Jeffery Atik & Hans HenTik Lidgard, Embracing Price D;scr;/I1blll/;OII: TRIPS nnd 
!I,e Srrpprcss;oll of Pnrallel Trade ill Phnrmnceu/;cnls. 27 U. P .... j. INT'L ECON. L. 1043, 1045-46 
(2006) (arguing that price discrimination is important in getting pharmaceutical products to the 
least developed countries); Daniel J. Hemcl & Lisa Larrimore Ouellette. 'l'mde nlld Tmdcofft: The 
vISe of Intemationnl Pa/ell/ ExII11I1S/ioll, 116 CoLUM. '- REV. SIDF.S ... R 17, 18 (20 16) (suggesting 
that cmtsand bcnefitsof an international exhaustion rule ..... o uld fa ll disparalelyon different groups, 
and that -the adopt ion of a rule of international palent CJ;haUsiion ..... o uld likely lo ..... er prices of 
patented goods in the United States and raise prices abroad·). 
'W Hemel & Ouellette, 5rrpra note 151, at 22-27. In contrast, I argued that fimu were likely to 
implement other forms of price discrimination, and that a proper analysis of the effects of 
inte rnat ional patent exhaust ion .... ·ould compare the effects of geographiC price d iscrimination to 
those of alterna tive formsof price discrimination. rather than no price d iscrimination. Wasscmlan 
Rajcc. Slipra note 96. at 366-67. In addition. I suggested tha t other, administrative controls on the 
importation of medicine would limit the effects of an in ternational patent exhaustion ruling on 
access to medicines. ld. at 371 -74. 
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in ternational exhaustion for patents in Lexmark, the Court showed 
concern fo r consumers, who would be unable to tell the di fference 
between impo rted goods subject to restra ints by IP rights-holders and 
domestic goods in resale markets that we re unconstrained. 
From a property rights view, the gradual expansion of the doctrine 
of exhaustion demonstrates a weakening of patent rights. The exhausti on 
doctrine is a limitation on a patent owner's right to exc1ude, i53 although 
it is consistent with property law's antipathy toward restrictive servitudes 
and restraints on alienation. 154 In that sense, the doctrine is very much a 
property law doctrine- it is simply one of man y limiting doctrines. By 
disallowing the use of patent rights to enforce licensing provisions that 
run with goods, exhaustion limits patent holders' abil ity to craft sales and 
licenses. ISS For example, a patent holder may have to compete for sales 
with used versions of her own product, thus limiting her ability to charge 
a premium price. Exhaustion also li mits a patent holder's ability to 
exe rcise price discrimination through field of use, geographic, or other 
restrictions. In short. while a patent grants a right to exclude, and patent 
holders can choose how and when to authori ze others to make, use. sell . 
offer for sale, or import things that embody a patent, the decision to sell 
a particular thing removes that th ing from her au thority. The contrary 
rule- one that allowed patent holders to attach conditions to post-sale 
use that were applicable to downstream purchasers- would requi re a 
more robust. less limited theory of property rights in patents. l56 
l~ SI!I! Amelia Smith Rinehart , COll /maiug Pn/euts: A Modern Plllell / t:.:chauslioll Doc/ri ll t:, 23 
I IARV. J.L. & TECH. 483, 484 (2010) (J"he right of a purcha5Cr to control the downstream sale and 
use of patented goods without obtaining consent from the patent owner conflicts with the right of 
a patent owner to exdude others from practicing hi$ invention ,",'hen selling or using those goo:xb; .• ). 
1)4 See Madison, sZlpm note 23, at 430-34. 
I» See Chiappetta, supra note 97 (arguing that exhaustion should only serye as a default rule 
and that patent holders should be able to contract around it). 
1)6 Duffy & Hynes, sZlpm note 95, at 5-6 (explaining that in an early copyright exhaustion case, 
a property rights theory would ha'·e been necessary to enforce post -sale restrict ions; thus, the 
argument made in a case arguing against exhaust ion was that by granting rights holders the 
exclusive right to sell their work, the sta tute wa5 granting exclusive rights for each and every 
downstream sale. The argument lost). 
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Molly Van Houweling and other scholars suggest that exhaustion is 
an example of property law's aversion to restrain ts o n alienation. i57 Th is 
view posits that property law itself conta ins the limitations that lead to 
the doctrine of exhaustion. In contrast, John Duffy and Richard Hynes 
argue that exhaustion is a doctrine that determines the domai n of 
intellectual property law- that is. after an authorized sale, patent law 
simply does not apply and the parti es must look to resolve their dispute 
th rough "whatever other sources of law might be applicable." 158 Both 
views recognize the limits of a patent to control the behavior of third 
parties who have no contractual relati onshi p with a patent holder. 
Moreove r, both views recogni ze the importance of third -pa rty property 
rights in their lawfully purchased goods, whether or not those goods were 
at some point covered by an intellectual property right. For the pu rposes 
of this Art icle, the salient point here is that the unl imi ted pro perty rights 
version of patent rights has co nsistently been struck down when it runs 
up aga inst strong thi rd-party property interests.IS9 
C. Post-Grant Reyiew of Scope and Validity ill O il States 
The most recent instance in which the Court eschewed real and 
private property law analogies related to post-gran t determinations of 
patent scope and validity. The patent application process, from inchoate 
interest to issued patent rights, has been a fl ash point for arguments about 
whether patent rights are better seen as admini strative grants-subject to 
administrati ve review and revocation- or property entitlements that can 
o nly be adjudicated in Article III courts. In real property language, 
however, a patent application is a form of staking claim to property, and 
a robust defense of that property (the patent, o nce issued) is what 
encourages investment. However, the calibration of patent scope and 
validity, performed by the patent office du ring patent examination, 
balances a number of in terests and the th resho ld question of whether the 
' J> Aa ron Penanowski & Jason Schultz, Digital ExIIllU5UQfr, 58 UCLA 1~ REv. 889, 9 12 (20 1 I ); 
Glen O. Robinson, PmOJral PropcrlyServitlides, 71 U. CHI. 1.. REv. 1449(2004); Molly Shaffer Van 
Ilouwding, TlrcNcwScn>itlides, 96 Gro. 1..1. 885,91 1-12 (2003) . 
• ,. Duffy & Hynes, mpra note 95, at II (quoting Frank I I. F..asterorook, Slalrrles ' Dtmmi,rs, 50 
U. CHI. 1.. REv. 533, 544 ( 1983»). 
'1>0 Sec discussion i,ifra Part IV. 
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desc ribed invention merits protection at allY,o In this way, its natu re is 
regulatory rather than real property-like. The Court recently addressed 
these two views of issued patents and held that even after issuance, the 
scope and validity of a patent may be adjudged through admini strati ve 
processes.161 However, the Gil States opin ion carefully constrai ned the 
scope of its Tuling, leaving room for stronger rea l property-like rules in 
other ci rcumstances. 
The process of determining whether a patent application ought to 
be granted involves much the same standards of patentability as the later 
determination of whether a patent is in valid;'62 however. in Oil States, the 
Court examined whether the nature of the right is different post-
issuance. 163 The case demonstrates patent Iaw's mix o f public rights and 
real property-type rights. by involving the government's admin istrative 
issuance of a right that is. post-issuance. meant to give incentives like a 
real property right. IM While property law- like metaphors of the chase. 
1 .. United States ex rei. Bernardin v. Duell, 172 U.S. 576, 586 (1899) (" [lin every grant of the 
limited monopoly two interests are in\'olvl'tl, that of Ihe public, who are the grantors, and that of 
the patentee."). 
1' 1 Oil States Energy Servs., LLC v. Gn'Cne's Energy Grp., LtC, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (20 18). 
001 Sec CUOZlO Speoo Techs., LLC v. u.'C, 136 S. Ct. 2131,2144 (20 16); scc illso Jacob S. Sherkow, 
Adminislrnling Pillcnt Litigillion, 9() WASil. L REv. 205, 232 (2015) (d iscussing how post.issuance 
proceedings at the PTO are trial·like and serve as alternatives to district court li tigation). Note that 
administrath'e determinations of invalidity post-issuance use a "preponderance of the cviden'e~ 
standard in contrast to district court proct.'Cdings thaI use a "clear and convindng~ standard to 
invalidate an issued patent. In addition, the !'TO uses a "broadest reasonable interpretation ~ 
standard in determining thescopeof palent claims for post·issuance review, whereas district courts 
do nO(. Bul the PTO recently announced it would change its practice to align its determinations 
with those of the district courts. 
16J Oil Siala, 138 S. Ct. at 1373 (lhis Court has recognil.cd, and the parties do nO( dispute, 
that the decision to grallt a patent is a matter involving public rights-specifically, the grant of a 
public franchise. Inter partes review is simply a reconsideration of that grant, and Congress has 
permissibly reserved the PTO's au thori ty to conduCl that reconsideration. ~). 
, .. See discussion suprn Section l B. 
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cuitivation,165 and capture l66 of ideas reflect a romantic notion of a 
sol itary, gen ius inven tor who toils away until en lightenment strikes, the 
non-rival nature of information means that state in terven tion is the 
means by which inventors are able to realize extra profits from their 
ideas. 167 There is no common law of patents and no natural law that 
logically leads to a hventy-year term of protection. \68 At the same time. 
unlike land, water, or personal property, inventions would not exist but 
for the work of inventors. In thi s sense, the creation of this right depends 
on both the creation of the inventor and the acknowledgment of that 
creation by the state. 
The state- through the patent office- and the inventor, are the two 
necessary parties to the creatio n of patent rights; however, the patent 
office also represents the public's interest in maintaining a robust public 
domain. 169 The inventor will bring what she considers to be her invention 
to the patent office through her application, and by submitting materials 
on the state of the art prior to her invention and her unique contribu tion, 
along with distinct claims about the scope of her exclusive rights. Then 
begins a process in which the examiner assigned to the application will 
perform he r own sea rch, review materials, and require the applicant to 
clarify or constrain her claims. The goal, as discussed above, is to allow 
an inventor exclusive rights in her invention . but not in anyth ing 
previously known. nor in things she has not discovered but that might fall 
lU JOliN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNME"-'T AND A LI:'TTER CONCERNING TOLERATI ON 
111 - 12 (Ian Shapiroed., Yale U. Press 2003) (1690) (~Whatsocver la man] removes out of the state 
that naturc hath provided, and left it in, he hath mixed his labour wi th. and joined to it something 
that is his own. and thereby makes it his property. It being by him removcd fro m the common state 
nature hath placed it in. it hath by th is labour something annexed to it that excludcs the common 
right of other mcn.~). 
'W Timothy R. Holbrook, Palcul Auticip(ltioll (Iud Obv;OllSnC$5 tIS Possession. 65 EMORY LJ . 987, 
989 (20 16) (-At the most basic, in tu itive level. inventors feci passionately about their creations, 
viewing them as the fru it of considerable labor. Innovators can have an in tuitive sense of 
ownership-that they are entitled to rights with respect to their invention because they created it. · ). 
For the centrality of capture and possession in property law. sec,e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Pos.scs.sioll 
tIS/lie Root ojTille, 13 GA. L REv. 122 1, 1221 (1979). and Rose, Slipra note 25. at 75 (explaining that 
-first possession is the root of lltle·). 
''''' See supra Section II.A. 
, .. See, ~g., Dccpsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp .. 406 U.S. 518. 525- 26 ( 1972). 
'60 See, ~g., Gordon, 5Ilpm note l ,al 1559 (casting the public righ t to use what is common or in 
the public domain as ~a splXies of property in even a stronger sense. for as a 'Iiberty right ' it is a 
stable and guaranteed entitlement"). 
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within the scope of broad claim language. In this way, the U.S. patent 
system seeks to carefully calibrate the scope of a patent to protect access 
to technology al ready in the public domain (or disclosed by others) and 
to avoid preemption offuture innovation . 
Issued patents can be invalidated or narrowed in later proceed ings. 
In fact, because patent examination is an ex parte process. often 
conducted before competition in a market has crystalized, patent 
exam iners- and even patent applicants- may lac k some of the context 
needed to identify important limiting claim language to meaningfully 
describe and constrain an in vention . l70 Thus, claim construction, a 
process by which the court rules on the meaning of va rious claim terms 
and thus the scope of the patent, is a routine part of any patent litigation. 
In addition. many patent infringemen t claims are met with defenses 
claiming invalidity of the issued patent. This can also be explained by the 
ex parte nature of patent examination. Competitors who are most likely 
to have in fo rmation on why a claimed invention is not new or non-
obvious are not part of the in itial proceedings. Moreover, the threat of 
litigation is motivation for patent infringement defendan ts to sea rch for 
in validating prior art that examiners might have missed. 
The nature of patent rights was determinative in Oil States. decided 
by the Supreme Court in 2018.171 In that case, Oi l States Energy Services 
had a patent on technology involved in hydrauli c fractur ing (also known 
as "fracking''). When it sued a competitor for in fringemen t, the 
competitor challenged the validity of the patent in an admi ni strative 
process called inter partes review. In Two things about the case are 
interesting for the purposes of examining property law analogy in this 
case. The first is about the purposes of inter partes review and the statute 
that increased agency review of issued patents. The second is about the 
centrality of the public versus private rights debate that ultimately 
reso lved the constitutional question central to the case and determined 
that patents are public franch ises fo r purposes of post-grant review of 
,,. See, e.g., Sarah It Wasserman Rajec, Pale/r ls Absenl Adl'Crsaries, 8 1 BROOK. L REv. 1073 
(201 6). 
171 Oil States Energy Servs., LtC v. Greene's Energy Grp .. LLC, 138 S. Ct. 136S (20 18). 
In Greene's Energy also argued invalidity as a defense to patent infringement in distrit:t court 
However. thai proceeding was stayed during the pendency of the administrat ive review of the 
palenl. fd. al 1370-72. 
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validity, and that it was therefore constitutional for an agency to make the 
determination of validity. 
While admin istrative reviews of issued patents ex isted prior to the 
America Invents Act, that legislation was intended to increase such 
challenges. This was a response to the increase of patent suits brought as 
nui sance suits and often brought with "weak" patents. 17l Here, "weak" is 
a shorthand to say that the patents are unlikely to withstand a validity 
challenge. The proliferation of such weak patents may have been a result 
of the standards applied by the PTO to newly arising technologies, such 
as software, that resulted in very broad claims. At the same time as there 
was a proliferation of broad and vague patents issued in sofhvare and 
related fields, a business structure arose to take advantage of the relati ve 
availability of such patents and the high cost of defending against patent 
infringement claims in federal court. "Patent assertion entities"L74 
acqui red patents and asserted them against business owners, knowing 
that business owners would rather settle the suit and license the patents 
than engage in an expensive battle to invalidate the patent. The rise of 
these patent assertion entities spurred a number of refo rms that sought 
to address the inefficiencies they introduced in to the marketplace. L75 One 
such proposal was the potential for admini strative review as a means of 
addressing the excess of weak paten ts and providing a cheap forum for 
m Sec, e.g., Ronen Avraham & John M. Golden, "From PI 10 IP~: Wigalio/! Respome 10 Tori 
Reform, 20 AM. l~ & ECO:-;<. ReV. 168 (20 18). Prior to passage of the America In\'ents Act, 
practitioners and scholars demonstrak>d concern over the potential for stra tegic litigation to extract 
:>eltlements and suggested that increased administrative review could solve such problems by 
lowering the costs of invalidating weak or o\'erbroad patents. Sec e.g., Joseph Farrell & Robert P. 
Merges, lucenlh'cs /0 Clwllengeillrd Defeud PnlClIls: Wily UUgnlion Wou '/ Relinbly Pix Pnlenl Office 
errors nud Wiry Adminislralh'c Patent Review Might /-fe/p, 19 BERkELEY TECH. L.J. 9H, 965 (2004); 
Stuart p -I. Graham & Dietmar Harhoff, Separating Pnlelll Whenl from Clrnff: WOljld tire U.s. 
Ikuefit from Adopting Pntent Posl·Gmlll Rt:View~, 43 RES. POl'y 1649 (2014). 
m A ~ patcnt- assertion entity,~ a tcrnl coined by Colleen Chien, is defined as an ·cntit[yl that 
usclsl patcnts primarily to get licensing fees rather than to support the development or transfer of 
technology: Chien, supra note 119, at 300. 
In See, e.g.,eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, I.I.C, 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) 
(noting new business models that usc the threat of an injunction to obtain larger licenses than 
warranted, particularly for in\'entions that are small components of larger goods and for patents in 
certain areas that are unduly broad and may have been improvidently granted). But sccChristopher 
A. Cotropia ct al., Unpacking Pntent A~crliou Eulilics (PAB), 99 MINN. 1.. ReV. 649 (2014) 
(analyzing litigalion from 2010 to 20 12 and finding that the percentage oflawsll ils broughl by PAEs 
did not grow significantly). 
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accused infringers to challenge the validity of a patent before engaging in 
the costly litigation of an in fringement tria\. 176 
While the purpose of post-issuance review may seem clear, it 
conflicts with a notion of patents as private property, where certain ty 
about ownership allows for fruitful investment and the potential for 
revocation by the state might lead to underinvestment. Numerous amicus 
briefs were filed in Oil States espousing the private property view of 
patents and suggesting that as private property rights, patents can only be 
revoked through proceedings in an Article III court. 177 Academics on the 
other side of the issue framed inter partes review of issued patents as error 
correc tion, allowed by language in the statute that defines patent rights as 
being «[slubject to the provisions of this title," wh ich includes provisions 
for administrative review of decisions to grant patents. 178 
The Court held that «the decision to grallt a patent is a matter 
involving public rights." Because in ter partes review "is simply a 
reconside ration of that grant," congressional grant of that autho ri ty to the 
PTO is permissible. l19 In holding patents to be pub lic rights, the court 
explic itly noted public interest in the grant of patents. In terestingly, the 
Court warned that the case "should not be misconstrued as suggesting 
that patents are not property fo r purposes of the Due Process Clause or 
the Takings Clause." lso In other words, the Court is contemplating that 
patent rights may take on the contours of different types of property in 
different contexts. In the context of potentially wrongly granted rights. 
the salien t characteristic of patents is that they are taken out of the public 
domain by an ad ministrative agency- if that was a mistake, the 
administrative agency is entitled to fix the mistake, as here. In contrast. 
the Court suggests that a properly gra nted patent that is later 
app ropriated by the government likely must be treated as private property 
and adjudicated as such. The idea that patents can take on different 
property characteristics in different contexts is inconsistent with the 
stronger, private property view of patents. However, as discussed above. 
I~ See supra note 173. 
m Oil Stales, 138 s. Q. al 1372-73 (e;tplaining that Congress cannot delegate po .... ocrs thai are 
vested in the jud iciary to other entities). 
11'1 Brief for 72 professors of Intellectual Property Law as Amici Curiae in Support of 
Respondents at 5, Oil States, 138 S. Ct. 1365 (No. 16·71 2), 201 7 WI. 5171470, at · 5. 
11'1 Oil Stllles, 138 S. Ct. at 1373. 
," Id. at 1379, 
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the Oil States Court engaged the same thi rd-party prope rty interests that 
held sway in eBay and Lexmark. albeit in a different context. The Court's 
opinion in Oil States is arguably the largest deviation from a property 
rights framework fo r patent rights, because, in departing from the vision 
championed by the property rights advocates, the Court looked beyond 
limiting principles already present in private property doctrine and 
instead looked to another area of property law, altogether- namely, 
public property. The next Part expands on the property law misfit and 
how it explains the Court's dissatisfaction with the private property law 
frami ng when that misfit is most sali ent. 
Ill. THE P ATENT LAW MISFIT 
The set of property rights analogies used with patents are helpful fo r 
conceptualizing what patents are meant to do and why thei r structure 
may help accomplish those goals. However, as discussed in the previous 
Section. the Court sometimes limits patent holder rights in ways that are 
seemingly at odds with a private property law fra mework. Th is is because 
while there is much descriptively useful about these various private 
property law analogies. there are serious differences from patent law. too. 
These diffe rences center on the role and interests of third parties- and 
the public generally- in patent law as contrasted with other form s of 
private property. Scholars have explored ways that a property regime does 
not fit patent law purposes. lS I One of the most discussed ways that patents 
d iffer from other sorts of property is the imposs ibili ty of defin ing their 
co ntours in a stable and self-conta ined manner. Unclear boundaries 
increase unce rtainty for rights holders and raise information costs for 
third parties. making a real property rights framework a worse fit. 182 
It, See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL J. M EURER, PIITENT FlllLURE: How JUDGES, 
BUREIIUCItATS, AND LAWYERS PuT 1l>."NOVATOItS liT RISK 29-34 (2008) (discussing ways in which 
patents differ from traditional n()(ions of property); lemley, supm note 5, at ]036-37 (listing 
problems created by treat ing and th inking about patents in the same manner as traditional 
property). 
III See, e.g., BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 181, at 46 (chapter three explains that - [al successful 
property system establishes clear, easily detenn ined rights.. O arity promotes effiCiency because 
'strangers' to a property can avoid trespass and other violations of property rights, and, when 
desirable, negotiate pennission to use the property· ). 
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Moreover, these uncertain 
determinations in addition to 
important ways. un 
boundaries affect infringement 
grant and scope determinations in 
In addition to this. however, are two other rel ated problems. First. 
patent law comes with a strong public interest in a robust public 
domain - that is, in a large set of thi ngs, unowned. !u And second. there 
is a difference between the object protected by patent ri ghts and the 
objec ts of infringement claims. This is important because alleged 
infringers often use their own property- replete with their own property 
interests- to make products that are infringing. The following Sections 
describe these misfits. This Part begins by ex plaining the notice and 
information cost problems with a private property framework for patents 
before shOWing how these other misfits identified in thi s Article 
exace rbate those problems and add the third-party property interest 
problem. 
A. Notice Failure. Boundary Ambiguity, and tile Importance of the 
Public Domain 
Patents have high notice costs that are compounded by thei r 
ambiguous boundaries. These characteri stics raise the costs of using a 
property system by raiSing costs of determining what patent rights apply 
to thin gs. 1ss Moreover. it raises the costs of determining that no patent 
rights apply to a thing. l86 Notice costs for patents are higher than they are 
for real property due to the difficulty in determining rights boundaries.ls7 
.t,) 5;:e, e.g., Sarah R. WaSS/!rman Rajec. /u/ringeme'l l, Uubouud, 3211 ARV. J.L & TECH. 11 7 
(20 t8). 
, .. 5;:e, e.g., Consol. Fruit-Jar Co. v. Wright , 94 U.S. 92, 96 (1876) (after C)[ plaining that patent 
rights are property and inventors arc a meri torious class dcsclVing of its rights, the opinion 
continues: M[ t [here is a like larger domain hdd in ownership by the public. Neither an individual 
nor the public can trench upon or appropriate what belong.i to the other"). 
'&) 5;:e, e.g., BJ Ard, Mare Property Rilles Ihan Property' '/lIe Right to };Xdude ill Patell t alld 
Copyrig/lt, 68 EMORY L J. 685, 720 (2019) (n{)( ing the n{)( ice failures endemic to patent law and 
suggesting that in contrast , Wlr]eal property presents relath'd y few notice problemsW ) • 
... See, e.g., Markman v. Westvic\.· Instruments, Inc .. 517 U.S. 370, 373 (1996); long. supm note 
27 (on infomlat ion costs to th ird parties even in the case of noninfringement). 
,I> 5;:e, e.g., long, SIIpra note 27; James Y. Stem, "I1IC Essen tial Stnlcture of Properly Law, l iS 
MIQ{. L REv. 1167 (20 17) (on costs of detcrmining ownership); Maureen F_ Ilrady, "I1te f-orgottell 
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Of course, real property boundaries can be deli mited in va rious ways and 
there can be uncertainty abou t what those boundaries are. 1118 In addition, 
uncertain ty as to ownership, recordation , title. and encumbrances are all 
familiar problems in property law. However, that uncertain ty pales in 
compari son with the uncertainty inherent in patent ri ghts. l 8'.1 This is 
because boundary problems and information costs are a factor for anyone 
operating in a field covered by patents, and there are considerab le costs 
to third parties. even when they are ollly determi ning that no patent 
prohibits a contemplated act. 190 W hile patents are subject to all the same 
problems of other types of property, such as disputes over ownership, 
title. etc .• it is disputes over their proper scope that dominate patent 
litigat ion I'll-and, as a result, dominate actors' decisions about how to 
avoid litigation. 
The patent statute requires applicants to describe their in vention, 
explain how to make and use it, and conclude by "distinctly claiming the 
subject matter which the inventor ... rega rds as the inven tion."192 Patent 
claims denote the scope of the exclusive right of a patent- and because 
they are Widely available to the public, th ird parties theoretically have 
notice of what is protected.193 Determin ing the scope of the claims is 
cen tral to a patent infringement lawsuit. I'J4 The mean ing o f claim terms 
is dependent on judicial rulings that are hard to predict and changing. 195 
lIistory 0/ Metes tIIld &mnds, 128 YALE LJ. 872 (2019) (on history of boundary-determina tion for 
real property in early America). 
l U See Brady. suprn note 187, for historical examples of property delineation. Brady points out 
that boundaries were not always entirely clear-and that th is method worked particularly well for 
those within a community. rather than for communicating to the world at large about boundaries. 
'" SceGreg Reilly, Completing tire Pictllre a/Unccrtllin Plltellt Scope, 9 1 WASH. U. L REV. 1353. 
1353 (2014). 
,. Sce long, sljprn note 27, at 483 (-Infonnation costs are more significant in intdle<tual 
property than in rea l property and personal property law. ~). 
,. , Sce Rei lly, supra note 189, at 1353 (MUncertain patent scope is perhaps the most significant 
problem facing the patent system.-). 
'n 35 U.S.c., 112 (20 18). 
it' The PTO websile and Coogle patenls arc easy lools for anyone tosean::h now. Sce discussion 
slIprn Seclion l.B. 
, .. Sa Greg Reill y, Irldiaal CaJXlcit;es and Pateut Cla;m COl/sln/cl;o/l: All Ordillilry Reader 
Staudard. 20 MICH. T ELECOMM. & TEcH. L REv. 243 (2014). 
'" See Mark A. Lemley, The Qlallging Memling o/Plltent Oa;1II ·femIS. 104 MICH . L REv. 101 
(2005); Jason Ranlanen, Tile Malleabilily o/Palelll Rights, 20 l S MICH. ST. L REv. 895 (2016). 
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This may be due to policy differences among judges about the approp riate 
method of in terp reting claims. l96 It may also be due to di fferent 
approaches among judges about what claim scope is meant to denote: a 
patent-holder's invention or a patent-holder's description of the 
exclusion to which she is entitled. 19? It may resu lt from ambiguity 
introduced by a patent applicant, either unintentionally. or with the 
intent to cover future and unpredictable variations on her in vention .198 
Regardless of the reason for thi s uncertainty, it distinguishes patents 
from real and personal property in an important way. Thomas Merrill 
and Henry Smith have suggested that the benefit s of standardized forms 
of property derive from lowered measurement costs to third parties. l99 
The same measurement externalities apply with respect to unclear 
boundaries of rights. Certainty about boundaries would allow third 
parties to avoid infringement, wh ile uncertain boundaries result in some 
undesirable chilling of activity by th ird pa rties. whether it is because they 
incorrectly analyze the claims of a paten t too expansively or because the 
measurement costs of determining those bounda ries-up to and 
including litigation-are too high relative to the value of the activi ty. 
And patents do have higher information costs than other forms of 
property.roo The boundari es of a patent are less ce rtain than the 
boundaries o f other things governed by in rem rights. lOl As Clarisa Long 
explains, because intellectual property rights are intangible, "determining 
and measuring the boundaries of intellectual goods are more difficult 
than determining and measuring the boundaries of real property," thus 
I .. See Tun-Jen Chiang & Lawrence B. Solum, nre In lcrprClaliou-Ctmslmcliou Disliuction in 
Pilleul!.aw, 123 YALE LJ. 530 (2013). 
It'> See Oskar Liivak, Tile Unresoi>'ed Interprdiw Ambiguity of Patellt Cla ims, 49 U.C. DAVIS L. 
REv. 185 1, 1854 (2016) (M[ Dliffcring case: outcomes can be explained as an unstated disagreement 
about the funda mental meaning of patent claims and not necessarily the result of policy 
differences.·). 
I. See Jeanne C. Fromer, Claiming inteilectlllli Property, 76 U. Oil. l~ REv. 7 19, 759 (2009). 
11>t Merrill & Smith,s!lpra note 93, at 26 (MWhether the objective is to avoid liability or toacquirc 
rights, an indi\'idual will measure tile property rights until the marginal costs of additional 
measurement equal the marginal benefits. When seeking to a\'oid liabili ty, the actor will seek to 
minimize the sum of the costs of ]jability for violations of rights and the costs of avoiding those 
violations through measurement."). 
_ See Long. mpra note 27, at 483 . 
• 1 See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Property Rights ill eDNA Sequellces; A New Resident for Ihe 
PubUc DOlllain, 3 U.CHI. L SCH. ROUNDTABLE 575, 576 (1996). 
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increasing the cost of avoiding infringement. 201 In patent law, the 
meaning of claim terms is determ ined by a standard of what a reasonable 
person would understand the terms to mean at the ti me of in vention. a 
theoretically objective standard that is onl y made certain once a court has 
rul ed on what that meaning is.203 A determinati on of the ownership of 
intellectual property is less problematic than determinations of whether 
there is a right and what its boundari es are, but it can still prove costly. 204 
The chill ing effects of high measurement costs are particularly 
problematic in patent law, where it is socially desirable to have third 
parties engaging in any activity that is not excluded and where there is a 
social interest in a robust public domain. In property d isputes, often a 
question of bo undary will be limited to the two parties with ownership 
interests in the property- whether the d ispu te is ove r real property and 
the boundary between hvo plots o f land or private property and the 
ownership of a particular thing. Patent law, in contrast, provides answers 
on ly to the question of whether an idea is inside the rights holder's claims 
or outside. If inside, the owner is entitled to exclusive rights fo r all the 
reasons listed above. If outside. however, the information may well be free 
for anyone to use. 2<lS As a result, patent litigation affects parties not before 
the court, and alleged infringers act as stand· ins fo r a public that has an 
interest in knowing the scope and validity of paten t clai ms.206 And unlike 
resident ial land or cars parked on a street. the patent system contemplates 
and welcomes the possibility of unowned and unprotected ideas. as 
evidenced by the patentability standards and term limits of patent ri ghts. 
There is no equivalent in private property where. for example. someone 
o n a street might look at a car and wonder whether th is is one of those 
.1 Long, supra note 27, at 483 . 
... Set: Mark. A. Lemley & Carl Shapiro, Probabilistic Patents, 19 J. t:coS'. PERSP. 75, 77 (2005) . 
.. /jut set: Stem, supra note 187, at 1167 (arguing that determining ownership is costly). 
~ This example excludes the possibility of overlapping in terests or coverage by a second patent 
for simplici ty's s.akc . 
.. Set: Michael J. Burstein, Reth;IIkillg Stat/dillS ill Patellt alal/Crlges, 83 Goo. WASH. L REv. 
498, 503 (20 1 5) (arguing for increased standing for parties seeking to ~qu iet titlc· to patents because 
-Iwlhen patents are of uncertain validity or scope, thcir mere presence creates risk and uncertainty 
that deters productive investments"); Wassemlan Rajec, m pra note 170, al 1074 n Tlhe outcome 
of patent litiga tion affects not only the part ies to the suit, but also the interests of other potential 
innovators and the public.~) . 
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ca rs that someone owns or whether it is free to take.207 In patent law, 
however, that perspective is welcomed- and the high costs o f making the 
determination distinguish patents from other types of property that are 
more appare ntly privately owned. 
B. Dominion and the Divide Between Protected Things and Infringing 
Things 
There is another misfit that has been less explored. This centers not 
merely on notice to third parties, but 0 11 the separate property interests 
third parties have in their own goods. One of the biggest misfits between 
patents and an in fern rights framework is that the "thing" protected is 
different from the "thing" that is most relevant to a lawsuit- the device 
accused of in fringing the patent.208 This is because the things protected 
by intellectual property rights are diffe ren t from most subjects of 
property rights. 209 The ideas covered by patents are intangible, nonrival , 
and- importantly- outside the control of thei r possessors. A patent 
holde r may manufacture and distribute goods that embody he r patented 
inven tion, but it is the info rmation that is protected by the right. Because 
the patent embodies in tangible information, the language of «things" and 
rights in rem are an uneasy fit. 210 This is true even though the exclusive, 
in rem nature of the rights is central to our understanding of patents. 211 
What the patent protects is intangible information that others are 
lkI Sec suprn note 71 and accompanying discussion. 'rherc are now companies that offer rentals 
of cars, bikes, and scooters throughout various ci ties , of course, but cvcn these are clearly owned by 
the company. 
1M Sec Smith, supra note I. at 1795 (explaining that the Mthings" that are the objects of property 
ri ght~ are constructed) . 
... Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes opinl'd on the difference b.!t ..... cen intellectual property and 
traditional notions of property in the copyright context: 
The notion of property starts, I suppose, fro m confirmed possession of a tangible object 
and consists in the right to exclude other$ from in terference with the more or less free 
doing wi th it as one wills. But in copyrigh t property has I't!ached a more abstract 
expression. The right to exclude is not d ircctl'd to an object in possession or owned, but 
is ill \'l1ct.o, so to speak. 
White·Smith Music Pub. Co. v. Apollo Co., 209 U.S. t , 19 (1908) (llolmcs, J., concurring). 
I I. Sec, e.g., Madison, supra note 23, at 383. 
II I See discussion $uprn Part I. 
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excluded from embodying.m In this sense, patents di ffer from real or 
personal property entitlements.2IJ because a patent need not settle 
entitlements to someth ing that cu rrently exists or with respect to a 
particular thing at all. Rather. it allows its holder to stop others from 
making (using. selling, etc.) anything that falls within the boundaries set 
forth in the patent claims.2L4 This prohibition restricts a potential 
infringer from building things with her OWll property, over which she 
exercises dominion. 2lS And, importantly, it restric ts the use of property 
over which a patent holder likely exercises no dominion. 
To return again to the car analogy, a property entitlement allows me 
to exclude yo u and others from intermeddling with my particular ca r. If 
you choose to procure or make a car that is identical to mine in every way. 
I have no legal recourse to stop you. In contrast, if I have a patent drawn 
to an automobile, I can stop you from making a car as claimed in my 
patent. even if you own all of the materials. and even if you have 
independently invented a car identical to mine. 216 Simi larly. the title to 
my car speci fies the precise car in which I have rights, whereas the grant 
of a patent is a right to stop the manufacture, use. and sale of all ca rs that 
fit the claims of my patent, regard less of ownership of the physical 
1Il Sec 35 U.S.c. ~ 27] (20]8) (stating that a patent right allows its holder to exclude others from 
making, uSing, offering for sale, selling, or importing the claimed invention in the United States), 
lIJ It is true that there can be private property rights in in tangible goods, And, patents may cover 
in tangible goods or processes, Here, I am discussing the disconnect between the in tangible ideas 
covered by patents and their embodiments, whether tangible or not, 
I " Sec, e,g" Madison. 5upm note 23, at 383 (2005) nn patent law, forcxample, the re i5the actual 
device that the inventor de\'eloped, and there is the legally distinct thing that the patentee owns, 
which the law knows as the patent claim, ~), However, there need be no ~actual device that the 
inventordC\'Clopcd,~ as an inventor nct.'d not have actually built a physical device in order to rcceive 
a patent; rather, she need only sufficiently describe it so tha t one ski lled in the art can build it 
without undue CJ[pcrimentation, Id. 
I I ~ It is true that most private property rights arc not unlimited-for CJ[ample, 1 may not use my 
car to trespass on your property; and those who own weapons may be subject to intentional tort 
claims if used against another person. Like the existence of private property rights over the types of 
th ings that are owned, however, limitations and rC!;trictionsoften track societal intuition about how 
property ought to be owned, and these limita tions, unlike patent rights, are not constantly changing 
and requiring constan t search. 
I I. Samson "emlont, Independent 11/I'I!lItioll as 11 Defellse to Plltent Ilifringcmelll, lOS MICH. L. 
REV. 475 (2006). 
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componen ts from which they are to be built.m Th is is a restatement of 
the fundamen tal difference between rights in property and the intangible 
rights that patents grant. And yet this di ffere nce has a number of 
consequences. Because information is nonrival- that is, one person's use 
of it does not diminish its availability for another- the grant o f exclusive 
ri ghts to information comes with deadwe ight 1055,218 This trade-off of 
current deadweight loss for future innovatioll (a nd the eventual entry 
into the public domain of patented inventioll s) is the bargain at the heart 
of the patent system. Unlike traditional property rights, however, the 
exclusive grant of a patent is broader and affects third party uses of their 
own property. 
The justification based on benefits to right holders appears to apply 
similarly at first blush: exclusive rights allow in ventors to reap rewards 
for successful inventions, encourage investment. and allow for transfers 
to others who value the right more.219 However, if right holders are unable 
to detect in fringement or enforce rights in efficient ways,no the 
investment incentives are lowered. Difficulty in detection of infringement 
and enforcement of patents flows directly from the lack of possession and 
control a patent owner has over allegedly in fringing "th ings" to wh ich her 
right pertains. At the same time, the cost sto ry to third parties is also more 
complicated than for real or personal property. Because paten ts cover 
intangible ideas. there is no signal to third parties, such as other inventors. 
that they are creating something protected.m Even if a patent holder is 
selling embodiments of the patent, notice is more complicated than it is 
117 The two-step process of a patent infringement detemlination i5 (1) determining the scope of 
the claims and (2) comparing the construed claims to the infringing dell icc. Markman II. Westview 
Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 374 (1996) (~Victory in an infringement suit requires a finding that 
the patent claim 'covers the alleged infringer's product or process: which in tum necessitates a 
detemlination of 'what the words in the claim mean:· (internal ci tations omincd»; see (I/so 1 
JANICE M. MUELLER, MuEULRO!' PATEh'T u.w: PATE!'TASILITY AND VALIDITY S 16.0 1 (2012). 
lit See e.g., Steven Sha\l: ll & Tanguy Van Ypersele, Re .... (lrds Venus Jlltel/ecfil(l/ Property Rights, 
44 ).1.. & Eco~. 525, 529 (2oo l }; Amy Kapczynski . nit COSI of Price; Why mrd 110 .... 10 Gel &yorrd 
/Illelltclrl(l/ Property /lrlenralism, 59 UCLA I.. REv. 970. 974 (2012). 
119 See discussion supra Part I. 
:. Efficient enforcement is generally enforcement against manufactu~rs or distributors as 
opposed to consumers and end users. 
lJI Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Pragm(ltic /Ilcremeulalism of Qlmmoll Ln .... Illtc/lectrl(l/ 
Property. 63 VAND. I.. REv. 1543, 1549 (2010) (noting ~t he intcrtelllporal problems inherent in 
granting plaintiffs open·ended, property-like exclusionary control over an inlangible· ). 
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for tangible, rival rous property because third pa rties can infringe th rough 
acts using goods entirely within their own domi nion. 
The existence of an innovative "thing" also does not telegraph the 
likelihood that i t is subject to patent rights in the same way that the 
existence of personal property tends to signal its "owned" nature to 
observers. This is because of the rohust publi c domain that is a central 
purpose and benefit of the patent system.222 By deSign, the public domain 
consists of knowledge and ideas that are unpatented- whether those 
ideas were unpatentable to begin with, no patent was ever sought, or they 
were disclosed in a patent now expired. This vast domain of unowned 
ideas is a fea ture of the patent system, not a bug.223 However, the result is 
that patent rights come with much higher notice costs than other 
property entitlements- and these search costs ap ply whether or not ideas 
are in fact covered by patent rights, because absent a patent search, a th ing 
that infringes on a valid patent is likely to look very much like a thing that 
is in the public domain and freely available to be copied. 
Unfortunately, there are costs to determin ing that something is part 
of the public domain.H4 If an observer wishes to undertake an action 
while avoiding in fringement, she must learn whether the information is 
protected by any form of intellectual property law; if so. what the scope 
(and validi ty) of that right are and what actions will result in liabili ty; and. 
if she intends to proceed and wishes to contract around the right. she 
must then di scover who is the owner of the right. m The relative difficulty 
of answering these questions for information protected by patents as 
opposed to other forms of property demonstrates that the traditional 
concept of in rem rights is already stretched when applied to intellectual 
III This may be bc<ause of fai lure to meet the requirements of patentability, dedsions not to 
seek patent protection, or the conclusion of a patent term and eX"piration of rights, inter alia. 
m See, e.g., Pfaff v. Wells Elecs., Inc., 525 US. 55, 64 (1998) (describing the -reluctance to allow 
an inventor to remove existing knowledge from public usc~ that bars patents for inventions already 
on sale); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 , 1S6 (1989) (- r nhe efficient 
operation of the federal patent system depends upon substantially free trade in publ icly known, 
unpatented design and utilitarian conceptions. ~) . 
lJ< I.ong,5upm nOle 27, at 476. 
m Sa d iscussion sl/pm Section IlA. For a discussion of the cost of determining ownership and 
its role in the struc!tJre of property law, see Stern, sl/pm note 187, at 1210- 11 (-[IJt is mutual 
exclusivity and the problem of titling that accounts for much of the high informat ion costs that 
property law confron ts.· ). 
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property law. The info rmation cost justification for exclusive rights 
becomes less compell ing when rights boundaries are uncerta in or not 
in tu itive. Information costs to th ird parties also present problems for the 
in rem justifications for patent rights. As di scussed above. titl e to personal 
property is to a particular "thing," whereas a patent grants the right to 
stop others from making. u Sin g, and selling things of their OWI1.226 As a 
result, the existence of a tangible good serves to give its own notice- that 
is, someone who sees a car knows whether and what fights attach to it 
insofar as they affec t the observer's duti es. So while there may be a lien on 
the car or it may be leased rather than owned, the observer has notice that 
she may not interfere with it. If the observer would like to contract with 
the owner, she may face the difficulty oflocating the titleholder. But once 
located, she knows that there are a limited number of form s that property 
ownership can take and her interest in buying the car (or leasing it) 
should be relatively simple to contract for. 227 The story with patented 
goods is different fo r observers, as well , both because of the high 
information costs associated with search and the attendant uncertainties 
about validity and scope and because of the fundamental purpose of 
enhancing the public domain through the gran t of private rights. Paten t 
law differs from real and personal property law because of the value that 
the public domain plays. There are many knowledge goods in the 
marketplace to which no intellectual property rights attach, and 
identification of such goods as unencumbered is an added operating 
cost. 228 Unfortunately, someone who plans to build a new gadget does not 
know, instinctively, whether that plan embodies a currently patent-
protected idea until she engages in a search at the PTO.m This search 
must include an analysis of term, scope, and validity of any relevant 
patent that is uncovered. And if a license is sought, current ownership of 
u. Set: discussion supra Part L 
II' Merrill & Smith, m pra note 93. 
u. In the car analogy, the public domain would be a pool of unowned Uf5, available to anyone 
to make use of as she saw tit. 
m Long, supra note 27, at 476 r Observef5 will need to learn about the att ributes of an 
intellectual good to avoid infringing it, to detennine whether they w1I ntto enter into negotiat ions 
wi th the property owner over it, and to build on il. Obseryef5 must also make second-order 
decisions regard ing how much infomlation to collect before making decisions regarding the 
good . ~). Even after discovering a relevant patent, an in terested potential user " i ll likely not be 
certain of the scope or validity of any patent she comcs across. 
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the patent must also be ascertained. 230 Goods that embody in formation 
protected by patents are not easily distinguishable from goods that do not. 
This means that determining whether information or an idea is al ready 
protected by a paten t is costly, even when there is no protection. 
Inven tors who run patent searches to determine their freedom to proceed 
with a new plan spend money and time to fi nd out that there are no 
relevant rights to block them. 23i 
The information and notice costs of patents as compared to other 
forms of property also fall on patent owners in the form of detection and 
enforcement costs. The value of an exclusive right to its holder lies in the 
ability to enforce it.m The gap between the protected information and 
the "things" that potentially in fringe make this a more d ifficult endeavor 
than for more traditional forms of property. The law often takes account 
of differing abilities to detect property rights violations. For example, the 
different liability standards for trespass to land and trespass to chattels in 
American to rt law derives from the greater dominion a property holder 
has over personal property.233 Suits for conversion o r trespass to 
chattels- that is, intermeddling with private property- require a 
showing of damages, whe reas trespass to land is a strict liability tort, 
requiri ng no damages to find liabil ity.134 Shyamkrishna Balganesh 
explains that this is because "movables, unlike immovables. are capable 
of being subjected to actual physical control by those who possess them," 
and suggests that a possessor ought to use "self-help" to protect the chattel 
against interference (which may include protective measures, rather than 
jJO Stern. supra note 187, at 1210- 11. 
m And even so. the search may not turn up everyth ing; there is a second order decision about 
how much to spend on such searches as well. See Long, supra note 27, at 476. 
m A fu ll discussion of the damages associatt.'d wilh patent infringement are beyond the scope 
of this Article. However, for a discussion of the connection between rights and remedies, sec 
lla noch Dagan, Remedie:, Right5, al/d Propert ie:, 4 J. TORT 1.. 1,3 (2011 ), and PENNER,supra note 
68, at 13 1 ("'There is a clear sense in which it is right to say that where there is a righ t there is a 
remedy, a statement often rendered in the latin IIbi illS ibi reml'liillm. which is th is: if an individual 
has no remedial rights in a legal system through which he can vindicate a righ t that he supposedly 
has, that righ t is not recogni7.ed by the s)'$tem: ). For a patent-specific discussion of injunctions 
versus damages as remedies for patent infringement, sec, e.g., Wassemlan Rajcc, supra note 114. at 
742-48. 
w Shyamkrishna Balganesh, Property A /oug I/le TOri Spec/nllt!; Trc:pass 10 Chattcis fwd the 
Anglo-American Docl ri lltl I 1Ji l'ergcIlU, 35 Co.\IMO:\' 1.. WORlD REV. 135. 142- 44 (2006). 
U< William 1.. Prosser, Nal ure o/Com'eNiol/ , 42 CORNELL 1_ REV. 168. 172-73 (1957). 
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simply force).m In this sense, however. patent rights entail less possession 
and dominion than tangible personal property o r even real property. 
Because the patent holder has disseminated her ideas to the public (albeit 
protected by her patent), she has no sense of who may have adopted and 
im plemented them. In addition, she likely has no possessory interest in 
the resources used to build in frin ging goods. As a resul t, a patent holder 
may have no reasonable way of knowing that in frin gement is taking place 
or discovering by whom. While property law may also encounter 
difficulties of identifying thieves and recove rin g stolen property, the 
owners generally have notice that a theft has taken place, and because 
physical goods must exist somewhere, will have an idea of where to start 
looking. However, patent law has mai ntained the fictio n that the rights it 
grants are in rem. while protecting an intangible idea from in fringement 
by an inchoate embodiment of that idea. This gap betwee n the thing 
protected and the thing a patent holder must identify in order to prove a 
claim of infringement may seem relatively unim portant for more 
traditional, tangible patented goods sold th rough traditional, centralized 
manufacturing channels. That is. the holder of a patent on a large 
machi ne may well keep an eye on other such mach ines on the market and, 
if she identifies one that appears to infri nge. may qu ickly identify its 
manufactu re r and bring suit. However, fo r some types of inven ti ons the 
fi t is worse than for others. Thus. when infr ingement is likely to involve 
multiple separate manufac turers or components. the goods are 
intangible. and there is direct distribution to end users, it may be more 
diffi cult for a patent holder to identify acts of in fringementJ l6 
IV . ANALYZING THE M ISFIT 
The previous Sections argued that private property rights. with their 
emphasis on protecti ng rights holders' autono my with in the boundaries 
of the right, are not a perfec t fit for patents and showed how, in a number 
of recent cases, the Court has declined to apply the strong view of 
property rights in patent cases. What do eBay, the exhaustion cases, and 
Oil States have in common? AU demonstrate misfits with property law 
due to th ird party interests. Moreover, in each stra in o f cases, the patent 
us Balganesh, SlIpm note 233, at 143. 
IlO Wassemlan Rajec, SlIpm note 183. 
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holde r's lack of possession couples with th ird pa rty in terests in the ir 
property. Justice Kennedy's eBay concurrence spec ifica lly identified 
situations in which injunctions might not be approp ri ate remedies. The 
contexts the opinion identifies are all instances of high notice costs and 
the poten ti al of privatizing information that ought to be un -owned and 
available to third parties for use. Similarly, the exhaustion cases 
demonstrate how courts prioriti ze third party property ownersh ip over 
intangible rights that would otherwise encumber goods while givi ng no 
noti ce of their existence. Last. the Court's declaration that patents are 
public franchises for the purposes of post-grant review (but not other 
purposes) demonstrates an attempt to fix the problems of unclea r rights 
and boundaries before they can do harm to the public domain . 
A number of potential critiques of this analysis can be made. For 
example, th ird party-concerns exist in traditional forms of property law 
and form the basis for a number of limiting doctrines. These doctrines 
can simi la rly perform a limiting role for patent rights- and in the case of 
exhaustion, third party interests are often considered to form the basis for 
the limitation. While limiting doctrines may playa role in m itigating 
concerns about th ird party in terests and notice. however. the 
ci rcumstances in which courts a re likely to turn away from a property law 
framework often occur when th ese limiting doctrines cannot suffici ently 
capture third party interests that are different in kind from those 
presented in property law. The misfit is not that there are third party 
interests at all , but that they are property interests in their own right and 
their importance is enhanced by a conception of public domain that 
simply does not exist in traditional private property law. Another 
potential critique is that third party interests permeate all of patent law. 
O ne might wonder, then, if third party property interests require 
deviations from a property law framework in some contexts, why not in 
all ? In other words. is there any place for a property law framework in 
patent law at all? For the most part. however, using paten ts to give notice 
to th ird parties and using the exclusive rights framework to resolve 
disputes among knowledgeab le innovato rs with in a field works fa irly. 
The misfit should primarily alarm us when rights bounda ries are least 
clea r. the public domain is at risk, and when the property rights of 
unwitting th ird parties are at issue. 
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A. Courts Deviate from Property Rules When the Misfit Is Greatest 
The Court's shift in eBar on the availability of injunctions is one 
example of the Court dismissing the arguments of property rights 
pro ponents. Injunctions have become less read ily available because of the 
importance of interests other than those of patent holders when it comes 
to patent remedies, 137 The particular ci rcumstances contem plated in 
Justice Kennedy's concurrence for denying injull cti ons directly 
demonstrate the various misfits discussed above. Recall that the 
concurrence discussed overbroad patents of dubious validity and the 
potential chill on third party innovation whe n patents are used to hold up 
other activities. 238 Of course, this is in part because the unclea r boundaries 
of certain types of patents result in higher notice costs to third parties- a 
misfit already identified in the literature. 239 But, more than that, 
overb road and potentially in valid paten ts take th ings from the public 
domain, through chilling effects on th ird parties and the costs of 
iden ti fying, analyzing, and invalidating the patents. These costs a re borne 
by the thi rd parties most interested in using the in forma tion protected by 
an invalid patent, but also by those who benefit from thei r productive 
actio ns. The potential fo r improvidently gra nted paten ts to do harm is 
greater in patent law than in real property- assigning an estate to the 
wrong heir harms the particular people involved, but ultimately, the 
estate is owned by som eone. The public's interest in its efficient use 
doesn't relate to whether it is owned or nol, but only that title is clear and 
its owner can use it. In patent law, in contrast, taking something that 
o ught not be owned and assignin g it to a private owner does harm to the 
world. So wh ile rights in rem may be rights against the world like real 
property- in patent law, determining the proper scope of that right 
affects the world more generally. In this way. eBay's change to the 
standard for injunctions may have been driven in part by th e importance 
of the public domain and the importance of haVing unowned property. 
The case exemplifies anothe r misfit : the separation of domin ion over 
the right and the infringing goods. Paten I injunctions requ ire in fringers 
to stop acts they have engaged in with their own property. To be sure, it 
U1 Wassemlan Rajec,SlIpm note 114. 
ut eBay Inc. v. MereU-change, L.LC, 547 U.S. 388, 396- 97 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
IJt Secsupm Section lIl.A. 
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is property that embodies the patent holder's right, so this possibility is 
clearly contemplated by the law. In a sense, then, it is not remarkable. 
However. it demonstrates how patent law sets itself above property 
interests in some contexts. Moreover. in the con text of complex 
inventions covered by multiple patents. it becomes an even greater 
burden on those third parties and a greater drag on innovative activiti es. 
This is not to say that injunctions are never warranted- nor is that the 
law- but merely to point out the higher cost, and the fac t that it comes at 
the expense of the property interests of third parties. Nor are the property 
interests of third parties the o nly part of thi s misfit. Because a patent 
holder has no dominion over her ideas, there is no inherent notice to a 
potential infringer that an idea is patented. Th is is again true for all 
patents, and part of the reason for the high notice costs, but it is 
particularly high, again, in the case of complex inven tions subject to 
multiple patents. 
The costs to third parties from this separation between thing 
protected and thing that infringes is cleare r in the contexts of patent 
assertion entities and complex inventions, both mentioned for the ir 
potential to cause holdup in eBay. The th reat of infringing patents might 
stop other innovators from taking full advantage of information rightly 
in the public domain. If numerous patents cover a product, avoidance 
costs grow. Similarly, while market participants may stay abreast of each 
other's activities and engage in cross-licensing, patent assertion entities 
are less likely to offer any such negotiations. The potential for hold up can 
therefore deter innovation. A noninfringe r's valid inventi ve ac tivity 
should be encouraged , not dampened. Removi ng the threat of injunction 
when a patent holder is not a market participant- and therefore not 
developi ng or investing in her rights- serves innovation more. 
Exhaustion may offer the strongest example of looking to third-
party property interests to limit the extent of intellectual property rights. 
The information that is at the heart of a protected patent and the goods 
over which thi rd parties exercise dominion are completely separate from 
each other. AllOWing patent owners to apply post-sale use limitations to 
thei r goods would stop purchasers from exercising autonomy over their 
own goods. In contrast to remedies, where an infri nge r is using their own 
property to infringe, in the case of exhaustion, the poten tial infringer is 
using property that they purchased from the patent holder or he r 
li censees. In other words, having sold or licensed the sale of goods, the 
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patent owner is now trying to dictate the manner of use to downstream 
purchasers. In addition to interfering with downstream purchaser's 
property interests. this poses its own notice problems. A number of 
exhaustion cases have involved notices attached to goods that purport to 
limit their use, NO however, the notice problem remains. The Court noted 
in Kirtsaeng v. John Wiley & Sons, inc.,w the case extending exhaustion 
to foreign first sales in the copyright context that preceded Lexmark. that 
a contrary ru le would result in indistingui shable goods in the United 
States with differing levels of restrictions. That is, imported goods with 
use or other restrictions would look exactly the same to consumers as 
goods first sold in the United States that were unencumbered by any 
restrictions by virtue of the first sale doctrine.m If private property is 
supposed to give notice of property rights through its very existence, and 
patents already fail in this regard,243 exhaustion saves it from being an 
even bigger fa ilure, in which authorized sales don't even protect 
downstrea m purchasers from infringement. The expans ion of 
exhaustion , then , can be seen as direc tly involved with the purpose of 
granting property owners au tonomy over thei r possessions and avoiding 
the notice problems that would go along with providing patent owners 
greater autonomy over embodiments of thei r ideas. 
The Court's language in Oil States most cl ea rly eschews a real or 
private property framework. At the same time, proponents of that 
framework may have been the most extreme in their rhetoric opposing 
the outcome, by, for example, claiming that agency review constitutes a 
"death squad" for "property rights." The importance of efficient post 
gra nt review, however, includes fewer of the misfit categories than the 
examples discussed above, because it involves o nly the state and the 
patent holder, and not third -party potential infringers. The Court stated 
that in the context of a patent grant and review of scope and validity, the 
patent right was most like a public franchise. However, by taking care to 
state that the characterization did not apply to other contexts, the Court 
was highligh ting that private property rights are applicable only as 
,. Set, e.g., Bobbs·Merrill Co. v. Straus, 210 U.S. 339, 341- 43 ( 1908) (discussing copyright 
contex t); Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Univcrsal Film Mfg. Co., 243 U.S. S02, 518 ( 19 17); 
Mallinckrodt , Inc. v. Medipart , Inc., 976 F.2d 700, 709 (Fed. Cir. 1992). 
'" Kirtsacng v. John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 568 U.S. 519 (20 13). 
, .. Id. at 543-45. 
m Seesupm Part IV. 
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required by the context. The Court was therefore both clear that patent 
rights are not always private property rights and ambiguous in giving no 
strict gU idelines for when patent rights ought not be characteri zed as 
property rights. 
The misfit analysis offers some explanation for why the Court may 
have decided as it did. The America Invents Act that authori zed broader 
post-grant review of patents was targeted at some of the same concerns 
that motivated the Court's opinion in eBay. In parti cula r, alloWing for less 
costly administrative review of patents- as opposed to the expensive 
process of invalidating a patent in a federal court proceeding- decreased 
costs on third parties of obtaining certain ty about the scope and validity 
of issued patents. Similarly, post-grant review lessened the potential for 
hold up through overbroad or improvidently granted patents by making 
it easier to invalidate such patents. While these outcomes don't eliminate 
the high notice costs to thi rd parties that accompany the patent system, 
they lessen the cost, and can be ex pected 10 concomitantly increase 
innovation as a result ,244 Moreove r. as discussed in the context of 
injunctions, above. third pa rty interests are not merely about who owns 
en titlements, but also determine what entitlements ought not be owned 
at all. The potential to invalidate patents that never ought to have been 
granted allows for that property to be returned to the public domain. 
The Court brushed over why and how patents can be a public right 
in the context of post-grant administrati ve review but remain a property 
interest for purposes of takings. However, in the context of taki ngs, the 
public interest is represented by the government that determines whether 
a taking is justifi ed. Instead of involving information costs to third parties 
o r other third -party interests, a takings case is primarily one behveen the 
government and the holder of a valid property right. For that reason, 
there is no reaso n to avoid the private property rights framework. Post-
gran t review, however. is an attempt to solve the problem of unclear 
claiming and mistaken granting by determ in ing scope and va lid ity later 
in time and with the potential involvement of an adve rsa ry. 
,.. While the measures may limit rewards for somc patent holders. those same patent holders 
will benefi t from the increased certa in ty and decreased hold lip possibilities of a system that allows 
for less costly assessment of val idity. 
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B. The Limits oftlte Misfit 
One critique of this view of patent rights is that the fac t of limitations 
does not itself di stinguish patent law from property law. Property rights 
are not absolute. It could be that some of the voices encouraging a 
property rights vision of patents are putting forth a "strong" version of 
property rights that is inconsistent with the limitations inherent in real 
property. Certainly, some who favor a property rights fram ework for 
patent law do so in order to suggest systematic limits to the rightS. 245 The 
Court's suggestion that injunctions might issue less frequently does not 
necessarily mean the Court abandoned a property rights framework, 
entirely. And, the fact that patent rights are exclusive may mean more 
about the nature of the right than a description of the appropriate 
remedy. 246 In addition, property law itself allows fo r the denial of 
injunctions.241 
It is true that property law contains numerous limiting principles-
and that those principles can be used to mitigate in formation costs and 
notice problems to third pa rties. However, the misfits identified in this 
Article are of a d ifferent scope- in the case of information costs- and 
different kind- in the case of possession problems- than those addressed 
by property's limiting principles. As a result, while they may help point 
out some of the contexts in which limitations are appropriate, they don 't 
always capture the full extent of the problem. The weight of the public 
interest in a strong public domain is much greater than in the context of 
property, wh ich doesn 't contemplate goods and lands falling out of 
ownership entirely. 
Another critique of the misfit analysis is that it appears to only justify 
changes that weaken the rights of patent holders. In the examples 
uS See. e.g .• Carrier. supra note 32; Christina Mull igan. A Nlllllerus CltUuus Principle for 
/mellectua/ Properly. 80 "fE.";o/. L REV. 235 (2013) (arguing that a numerous clausus limitat ion on 
property ought to apply in intelle(:tual property). 
, .. See Shyamkrishna Salganesh. I>emJ$tifyi/rg t/rt Riglr l to Exclude: Of Property, /m'Jo/ability, 
tUrd Automatic /Irjwrclkm s. 31 IIARV. J.L & PUB. POL'y 593 (2008) (arguing that the exclusionary 
function of a patent is to exclude impo$C a duty on the world rather than to impo$C the particular 
remedy of an injunction) . 
..,. Carrier. supra note 32, at 73 rOThe right to exclude is limited by the la .... 'S on encroachments. 
good faith improvers. boundary line disputes, bona fide purchasers. and public 
accommodations .. .. [Mlodern courts will not enjoin encroachmcnu that are minimal. that would 
be costly to remove, and that result from innocent mistakes.-). 
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discussed above, the Cour t ruled against patent holders or weakened their 
claims. However, the misfit itself can disadvantage rights holders in ways 
that suggest a less property.like application of patent law to their benefit. 
as wel l. For example, a patent holder's lack of dominion over her ideas-
and the third party's corresponding dominion over the property used to 
infringe- mean that detection costs for a rights holder can be much 
greater than for an owner of person or real property. The owner ofland 
may detect trespassers in various ways; a vehicle owner will surely become 
aware when her car has been appropriated by someone without 
authori zation; a patent owner, however, has no immediate warni ng when 
someone else is appropriating her idea wh ile using their own property. In 
previolls work, I have suggested that doctri nes that allow for indirect 
infringement and for infringement li ability for cross-border acts allow 
courts to add ress the difficulty patent holders can have enforc ing their 
rights.248 The view in that article is that doctrines that allow fo r 
infringement, unbound- or infringement when fewer than all claim 
elements are met by one entity or in one jurisdiction- are upholding the 
innovation-encouraging aspects of patent law, particularly when applied 
in ways that take accoun t of th ird-pa rty noti ce costs, toO. 249 
CONCLUSION 
Whi le patent rights are often explai ned with reference to real 
property, a number ofrecent cases have demonstrated that the Supreme 
Court is open to other analogies and interests. These deviations from a 
property fra mework make sense because of the misfit between patent 
rights and a property rights framework. In particular, collrts are less likely 
to use real property-like notions of trespass whe n third parties are likely 
to bear high information costs- even to determine that there is no 
relevant patent constraining their action- or when third parties have a 
strong interest in exercising dominion over their own property that is in 
conflict with patent rights. These outcomes are directly traceable to a 
pa rticular type of misfit between paten t rights and their in rem 
conception. This observation does not merely have predictive value. It 
grants a normative basis for when patent law ought to move away from 
, .. Wassennan Rajec, SlIpm note 183. 
lOt Id. 
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property law as the beginning and end of analysis. Because of the misfit 
between property law's domin ion-based rules and patent law's b road 
reach, curtailing patent law's rights of exclusion make sense in some 
contexts. This Articl e lays out a framework o f what those contexts might 
be. and how valuing property rights may occasionally mean valu ing the 
ri ghts of third parties in their property over the interests of patent 
holders. 
